Most people believe that Xi Jinping was selected as Hu Jintao’s successor due to a power struggle, the compromise and balance among different power and interest groups in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Many also looked to Xi Jinping’s family background, his princeling status, his understated manner in political circles, and even his wife’s reputation and connections.
All of those factors probably played a role, and all point out that Xi Jinping fits the requirements to be an heir. But what is the requirement and whose requirement is it? Previously, answering these questions was easier.
Mao Zedong, the first-generation leader of the CCP, had established his absolute power, and there was no doubt only he could appoint his successor. Mao selected five different successors. Before the Cultural Revolution, he chose Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, Wang Hongwen, and Hua Guofeng.
Liu Shaoqi, who later became Mao’s main target of the Cultural Revolution and died in detention, was hardly a successor because he was almost the same age as Mao.
Lin Biao was the first one whose appointment as Mao’s successor was written in the Party Charter. Lin Biao was the most important supporter of Mao’s controversial Cultural Revolution. After Lin’s plane crashed in Mongolia, Mao needed to select another successor.
Mao considered his contribution to Marxism to be “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat,” which was represented by the Cultural Revolution. Wang would continue the revolution but didn’t have any support from the Party, the government, or the military. If Wang couldn’t survive after Mao was gone, how could Wang defend Mao’s legacy?
That’s the reason why Mao finally abandoned Wang and picked Hua Guofeng. Hua was not the one that could continue his revolution but was the one that could survive much longer and wouldn’t turn against Mao on this issue. However, Deng Xiaoping ousted Hua Guofeng by force, more or less.
Deng should not have had any problem picking his own successor. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were his right and left arms during his economic reform, even though they probably had different opinions from his on political reform.
By the spring of 1989, when the students took to the Beijing streets following the death of Hu Yaobang, the differences between Deng and Zhao Ziyang had become intolerable. Deng urgently needed someone as his successor who would not turn against him following the coming massacre.
Jiang Zemin was selected, not because he was capable of running the country but because he was the only one at the provincial level who had suppressed the so-called “bourgeois liberalization” at the moment when the outcome of the struggle in Zhongnanhai could not yet be clearly seen.
Both Mao and Deng followed hidden rules in handpicking a successor: Choose the one least likely to allow the blood debt that is owed to be paid, or choose the one least likely to turn against the worst political burden.
The situation Jiang Zemin faced was totally different. Deng not only picked his own successor in Jiang but also picked Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, for him. When Jiang was about to hand over his power, he still didn’t have the power to overturn Deng’s choice of Hu.
All of those factors probably played a role, and all point out that Xi Jinping fits the requirements to be an heir. But what is the requirement and whose requirement is it? Previously, answering these questions was easier.
Mao’s Choices
Mao Zedong, the first-generation leader of the CCP, had established his absolute power, and there was no doubt only he could appoint his successor. Mao selected five different successors. Before the Cultural Revolution, he chose Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, Wang Hongwen, and Hua Guofeng.
Liu Shaoqi, who later became Mao’s main target of the Cultural Revolution and died in detention, was hardly a successor because he was almost the same age as Mao.
Lin Biao was the first one whose appointment as Mao’s successor was written in the Party Charter. Lin Biao was the most important supporter of Mao’s controversial Cultural Revolution. After Lin’s plane crashed in Mongolia, Mao needed to select another successor.
Mao considered his contribution to Marxism to be “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat,” which was represented by the Cultural Revolution. Wang would continue the revolution but didn’t have any support from the Party, the government, or the military. If Wang couldn’t survive after Mao was gone, how could Wang defend Mao’s legacy?
That’s the reason why Mao finally abandoned Wang and picked Hua Guofeng. Hua was not the one that could continue his revolution but was the one that could survive much longer and wouldn’t turn against Mao on this issue. However, Deng Xiaoping ousted Hua Guofeng by force, more or less.
Deng’s Arrangements
Deng should not have had any problem picking his own successor. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were his right and left arms during his economic reform, even though they probably had different opinions from his on political reform.
By the spring of 1989, when the students took to the Beijing streets following the death of Hu Yaobang, the differences between Deng and Zhao Ziyang had become intolerable. Deng urgently needed someone as his successor who would not turn against him following the coming massacre.
Jiang Zemin was selected, not because he was capable of running the country but because he was the only one at the provincial level who had suppressed the so-called “bourgeois liberalization” at the moment when the outcome of the struggle in Zhongnanhai could not yet be clearly seen.
Both Mao and Deng followed hidden rules in handpicking a successor: Choose the one least likely to allow the blood debt that is owed to be paid, or choose the one least likely to turn against the worst political burden.
Jiang’s Dilemma
The situation Jiang Zemin faced was totally different. Deng not only picked his own successor in Jiang but also picked Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, for him. When Jiang was about to hand over his power, he still didn’t have the power to overturn Deng’s choice of Hu.
Just as Deng had his blood debt, Jiang also had his—the persecution of Falun Gong. Even though he couldn’t choose his successor, he still managed to put enough of “his” men in the standing committee of the Politburo. Five of the nine members in Hu Jintao’s standing committee of the Politburo were considered Jiang’s Shanghai gang.
Two others were not considered part of the Shanghai gang but shared with Jiang his blood debt. Wu Guanzheng, the former Party secretary of Shangdong Province, was responsible for the persecution of Falun Gong in that province when he was in charge. Luo Gan had been in charge of the nationwide persecution since its beginning in 1999.
Jiang didn’t have the power to arrange Hu Jintao’s successor for Hu. But Hu also couldn’t appoint his own successor as Jiang’s gang and other interest groups shared the political power with him.
Like Mao, Deng, and Jiang, Hu has his own human rights disasters: the Tibetans, the Uighurs, victims of forced home demolitions, and the continuing persecution of Falun Gong. This time, more than one group in power needs the protection that comes from collection of the blood debt that is owed.
Further complicating the choice of successor is how economic advantage is tied to political power.
Jiang created a new form of political struggle: the economic weapon. Jiang allowed or even forced everyone in the Party and the government to become corrupt and then selectively used the prosecution of corruption to destroy his opponents or anyone who refused to bow to him.
When he put Chen Xitong, the former Party head in Beijing, in jail on the charge of corruption, he set a precedent that is very dangerous for the stability of the Party. Others also can use this weapon against their opponents and competitors or even against Jiang himself.
Hu Jintao used almost the same charge to put away Chen Liangyu, the Party head of Shanghai, where Jiang’s power is concentrated.
In choosing a successor for Hu, all the powerful Party groups, whether they began as princelings or as part of the Youth League group, need someone who can protect them from the people collecting on the human rights debt that is owed.
All of the Party groups also need someone who is “nice” enough not to put them or their families in prison on the charge of corruption should they lose out in the political struggle.
Most importantly, they all wish that Hu’s successor could prevent the ship of the Party from sinking. After all, they owe everything to the power of the CCP. For that reason, they need to put aside their differences temporarily.
And so, the choice of Xi Jinping has resulted, as the most powerful individuals in China have sought protection from paying debts for human rights abuses and corruption and to somehow keep the Party going.
But the CCP is still a revolutionary and destructive organization that depends on continuing conflict to keep it alive. That’s why, after the Cultural Revolution, there was the Tiananmen Square massacre and the persecution of Falun Gong even though most people, both inside and outside China, thought these were unreasonable and unnecessary.
When the Party loses the fire of struggle, it is dying no matter how strong it looks from the outside. Is the polite Xi Jinping the man who would either transform the Party’s nature or else give it new life with another fierce campaign?
Two others were not considered part of the Shanghai gang but shared with Jiang his blood debt. Wu Guanzheng, the former Party secretary of Shangdong Province, was responsible for the persecution of Falun Gong in that province when he was in charge. Luo Gan had been in charge of the nationwide persecution since its beginning in 1999.
Settling on Xi
Jiang didn’t have the power to arrange Hu Jintao’s successor for Hu. But Hu also couldn’t appoint his own successor as Jiang’s gang and other interest groups shared the political power with him.
Like Mao, Deng, and Jiang, Hu has his own human rights disasters: the Tibetans, the Uighurs, victims of forced home demolitions, and the continuing persecution of Falun Gong. This time, more than one group in power needs the protection that comes from collection of the blood debt that is owed.
Further complicating the choice of successor is how economic advantage is tied to political power.
Jiang created a new form of political struggle: the economic weapon. Jiang allowed or even forced everyone in the Party and the government to become corrupt and then selectively used the prosecution of corruption to destroy his opponents or anyone who refused to bow to him.
When he put Chen Xitong, the former Party head in Beijing, in jail on the charge of corruption, he set a precedent that is very dangerous for the stability of the Party. Others also can use this weapon against their opponents and competitors or even against Jiang himself.
Hu Jintao used almost the same charge to put away Chen Liangyu, the Party head of Shanghai, where Jiang’s power is concentrated.
In choosing a successor for Hu, all the powerful Party groups, whether they began as princelings or as part of the Youth League group, need someone who can protect them from the people collecting on the human rights debt that is owed.
All of the Party groups also need someone who is “nice” enough not to put them or their families in prison on the charge of corruption should they lose out in the political struggle.
Most importantly, they all wish that Hu’s successor could prevent the ship of the Party from sinking. After all, they owe everything to the power of the CCP. For that reason, they need to put aside their differences temporarily.
And so, the choice of Xi Jinping has resulted, as the most powerful individuals in China have sought protection from paying debts for human rights abuses and corruption and to somehow keep the Party going.
But the CCP is still a revolutionary and destructive organization that depends on continuing conflict to keep it alive. That’s why, after the Cultural Revolution, there was the Tiananmen Square massacre and the persecution of Falun Gong even though most people, both inside and outside China, thought these were unreasonable and unnecessary.
When the Party loses the fire of struggle, it is dying no matter how strong it looks from the outside. Is the polite Xi Jinping the man who would either transform the Party’s nature or else give it new life with another fierce campaign?
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