Leadership Changes in China’s Eastern Command Signal Growing Focus on Taiwan

China’s Eastern Theater Command has seen significant personnel changes and stepped-up activity in recent months, an indicator of Beijing’s intentions with regard to Taiwan.

Soldiers disembark from AAV7 amphibious assault vehicles during the Han Kuang military exercise, simulating a PLA invasion of the island, in Pingtung, Taiwan, on July 28, 2022. Annabelle Chih/Getty Images

China’s strategically significant Eastern Theater Command has recently seen a series of notable leadership changes. The area is a potential launch point for actions against Taiwan. Reports from Japanese sources, corroborated by aerial imagery and expert opinions, suggest that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has ramped up preparations related to the island nation in the past year.

On Aug. 3, a report from China’s Nanjing Television highlighted a visit by officials from Nanjing, where the Eastern Theater Command is headquartered, to several key military establishments. The visit saw the participation of high-level military and local authorities, such as Gen. Lin Xiangyang, commander of the Eastern Theater Command, and Adm. Liu Qingsong, its political commissar, among others.

Prominent changes within the military branch hint at Beijing’s increased strategic emphasis on Taiwan, as observed through the rapid rise of key figures closely aligned with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Of particular note is Lt. Gen. Wu Junbao’s appointment as the commander of the Eastern Theater Command’s air force. His prior role was as its deputy commander. His distinguished career includes a role as a staff officer for an aviation brigade in the previous Nanjing military region’s air force and as the commander of Shanghai’s air force base. In 2014, his achievements were recognized with a promotion to major general.

Similarly, Adm. Liu, previously serving as the political commissar of the Northern Theater Command, took on an important new assignment as political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command in June 2023.

His career trajectory has been marked by significant roles, including his tenure as the deputy political commissar and naval political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command. As recently as January 2022, while he was the political commissar of the Northern Theater Command, he received a promotion to the rank of admiral. His latest move underscores the strategic reshuffling in the upper echelons of the CCP’s military structure.

Gen. Lin, a trusted confidant of Mr. Xi, has experienced a meteoric rise within the CCP’s military hierarchy. In 2020, at just 56, he was appointed commander of the Eastern Theater Command’s army and was elevated to the rank of lieutenant general that same year. The subsequent year saw him shift roles to lead the Central Theater Command, while also being promoted to the rank of general.

However, last year Gen. Lin was called back to the Eastern Theater Command, resurfacing as its commander.

In another notable shift, Lt. Gen. Kong Jun, the inaugural commander of the PLA Marine Corps, was positioned as the ground force commander of the Eastern Theater Command at the close of 2021.

These movements underscore the importance the CCP places on its eastern frontier, as exemplified by Gen. He Weidong’s 2022 promotion from heading the Eastern Theater Command to being vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission.

Geopolitical Significance of the Eastern Theater Command

The CCP operates five major theater commands, with the Eastern Theater Command headquartered in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province. This command oversees the armed forces in several provinces and cities and has jurisdiction over crucial maritime zones such as the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Given its geopolitical significance, military commentator Xia Loshan told The Epoch Times on Aug. 5 that the Eastern Theater Command would be at the forefront should tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait. Should conflict ensue, this command would not only serve as the primary launch point for an attack on Taiwan but would also likely lead the charge, supported by troops from the other theater commands.

Adding to the shifts within the Eastern Theater Command is a recent disclosure to The Epoch Times by a source within the Chinese military. The source revealed that the CCP’s Strategic Support Force, dedicated to supporting battlefield operations across various domains, including aerospace and cyber, is currently operating at an intensified pace, presumably in war preparation.

The personnel changes and stepped-up activity further stress the evolving dynamics in the region and hint at Beijing’s strategic calculations surrounding Taiwan.

Members of the Peoples Liberation Army band are seated during the Opening Ceremony of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, at The Great Hall of People, in Beijing, China, on Oct. 16, 2022. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

PLA’s Activities Near Taiwan Alarm Japanese Media

Nikkei Asia raised the alarm on Aug. 1 about the changing nature of PLA activities around Taiwan. Citing U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last year as a possible trigger, the Nikkei report highlighted how the PLA has expanded its operational horizon, especially to the east of Taiwan, suggesting possible preparation for a blockade strategy.

Historically, the PLA’s military aircraft and warships seldom ventured east of Taiwan. However, this changed markedly in the spring of 2023.

In April, China’s first domestically-produced aircraft carrier, the Shandong, carried out take-off and landing drills in the West Pacific. This venture of the Shandong followed similar exercises by another Chinese aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, last December in the Philippine Sea.

In April and May, the PLA’s TB001 attack drone and BZK-005 reconnaissance drone were observed circling Taiwan.

Further, in mid-summer, the Shandong conducted a series of exercises “under strict combat-oriented requirements,” in an undisclosed sea region, according to Chinese state media the Global Times.

On July 30, the Global Times reported that the carrier “could soon embark on its second far sea voyage beyond the ‘first island chain,” which includes the Kuril Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and Borneo.

Recorded sightings of PLA aircraft east of Taiwan have surged, the Nikkei report said. Between Ms. Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan through February of this year, sightings fluctuated between zero to three days per month. Since March, however, numbers have risen significantly, totaling ten days in April, 12 days in May, six in June, and 12 in July.

Analysts believe the sequence of military exercises hints at Beijing’s intent to form a comprehensive blockade around Taiwan.

“As China has achieved maritime expansions into the East China and South China seas, it can fully blockade Taiwan from three directions when it advances into the Western Pacific,” Yujen Kuo, director of Taipei’s Institute for National Policy Research, told Nikkei.

Beyond Taiwan, the CCP’s assertiveness is also evident in other areas. Chinese vessels have frequently breached Japan’s territorial waters in the East China Sea, with an unprecedented intrusion lasting over 80 hours in April.

Meanwhile, since 2013 Beijing has constructed seven artificial islands—essentially unsinkable aircraft carriers—for use as military bases in the South China Sea.

But despite the outward show of might, internal dynamics suggest not all is well within the PLA.

Mr. Xi’s repeated calls for loyalty hint at possible internal tensions. The PLA’s military newspaper, in an Aug. 3 editorial, stressed unwavering loyalty to the CCP, emphasizing “the party’s absolute leadership.”

Questions about this loyalty arise from recent developments. The PLA’s Rocket Force underwent an unusual collective dismissal of its leadership in recent months. Additionally, speculation is rife about the whereabouts of Gen. Ju Qiansheng, the commander of the Strategic Support Force, following his conspicuous absence from major events. This mystery is compounded by the disappearance of the force’s deputy commander, Lt. Gen. Shang Hong, who dropped from sight last year.

These concurrent developments underscore the shifting geopolitical dynamics in the region and provide a glimpse of a possible power play within the PLA itself.