More than 1,000 U.S.-based organizations have individuals involved in collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through its “United Front” influence network, according to a China expert.
“It’s a tool that can be used for technology transfer. It’s a tool that can be used to talent spot—whether you’re looking for political talent, whether you’re looking for scientific talent—to bring back to the PRC,” Mattis said, using the abbreviation of China’s official name, the People’s Republic of China.
Mattis described a scenario in which trusted civic and cultural associations, such as Rotary clubs, Kiwanis clubs, and parent-teacher associations, could be leveraged to obscure Chinese influence when even a single member is “knowingly collaborating with the CCP.”
Such dynamics distort representation, leading elected officials—from governors and senators to local council members—to believe they are representing constituents when, in reality, they are being used to convey “Beijing’s voice,” he said.
“They’re essentially hijacking our citizens’ voices to represent the party,” Mattis said. “This is fundamental to what it means to have sovereignty embedded in the people.”
United Front
China’s overseas police stations fit into the broader United Front system of influence, Mattis said.Mattis said the United Front system also reflects the CCP’s model of governance, which places ideological control on par with external military threats. He pointed to China’s 2015 National Security Law, which defines national security as the relative absence of international or domestic threats to the party’s ability to govern.
That broad definition, he said, drives a constant effort to identify risks to party rule.
“So there’s always a perpetual search for enemies, a perpetual search for ideas that are dangerous,” Mattis said. “So the border that matters is not the People’s Republic and the rest of the world, it’s the party and everyone else.”
In practice, this concern extends beyond China’s borders to how Beijing views overseas Chinese communities, Mattis said.
“Are there ideas that can be transmitted back into the PRC that would threaten the party’s ability to rule?” he said.
“How do you ensure that there are no Chinese communities abroad that are going to be transmitting these ideas back into the PRC in ways that would resonate? Because you and I can’t do that, but those communities can.”
As a result, China has expanded its media influence in the past two decades, and most Chinese-language media outlets have aligned with the CCP, with a few exceptions, Mattis said.
Additionally, the CCP has exported its information firewall to WeChat, a popular Chinese messaging and social media app, so that Chinese nationals continue to live inside the CCP’s “information bubble” even after leaving China.
“Wherever there is connectivity to the PRC, it can be weaponized, and the party is willing to weaponize it against people,” Mattis said. “Whether that means shaping what they read, shaping what they hear, shaping how they interact.”
Ultimately, China’s United Front is not a platform for genuine exchange between Beijing and other democratic countries, Mattis said.
“[Former Chinese leader] Mao Zedong described United Front work as a tool to storm and shatter the enemy’s position,” he said. “That means that organization is about political struggle. It’s not about exchange. This isn’t a way that we reach Chinese people. This isn’t a way that we reach to the party leadership. This is there to affect us, not allow us to affect them.”








