Jiang Zemin’s days are numbered. It is only a question of when, not if, the former head of the Chinese Communist Party will be arrested. Jiang officially ran the Chinese regime for more than a decade, and for another decade he was the puppet master behind the scenes who often controlled events. During those decades Jiang did incalculable damage to China. At this moment when Jiang’s era is about to end, Epoch Times here republishes in serial form “Anything for Power: The Real Story of Jiang Zemin,” first published in English in 2011. The reader can come to understand better the career of this pivotal figure in today’s China.
Chapter 8: Seizing Beijing by Ousting Its Mayor, Chen Xitong; Intimidating Taiwan With Missile Fire (1995–1996)
At the 4th Plenary Session of its 14th Congress, the CCP announced the completion of its power transition from its second generation of leaders to its third. At the time Deng Xiaoping’s health was steadily declining. At the 14th Congress, Deng undermined his own power base by asking long-time strong supporters Yang Shangkun and his brother to resign from the military. Jiang Zemin, who was Chairman of the CCP’s Military Commission though he had never so much as touched a gun, feared terribly that the military would not follow him as its leader. Seeing that other senior Party members were in a weakened position and knowing that he indeed had followers in the military, Jiang proceeded to focus on the Beijing municipal government—a key political battlefront.
Beijing has always been the target of power struggles. Without controlling the Beijing Garrison, the Beijing municipal government, and the Central Security Guard regiment, a top CCP leader could never feel secure. Before the Cultural Revolution, when Mao Zedong was worshipped in idolatrous fashion, the Beijing Municipal Party Secretary at the time, Peng Zhen, dared to order the People’s Daily, The Beijing Daily, and Guangming Daily not to publish Yao Wenyuan’s article “History’s New Drama: Hairui Resigns from Government Office.” Mao Zedong had to ask his loyal followers in Shanghai to publish the article as a separate booklet, saying Beijing had become an independent kingdom that “needles could not penetrate and water could not permeate.” At the end of March 1966, before the official May 16 nationwide launch of the Cultural Revolution, Mao first removed from office Peng Zhen (Party Secretary of Beijing) and Lu Dingyi (Minister of Propaganda). Even Mao Zedong, the Party Chairman for whom “one sentence [was] equivalent to ten thousand,” needed to control Beijing before he could truly accomplish much. It was for this reason Jiang was anxious about conquering Beijing.
1. Making Enemies With Chen Xitong
In selecting cadres, Jiang had only one principle: those who were not loyal to him wouldn’t be used. One can just imagine what kind of administration this would make for. When Chen Xitong was Mayor of Beijing the city successfully hosted the 1990 Asian Games and completed the construction of the second and the third ring roads, considerably improving the city’s infrastructure. In comparison, under Jiang’s rule the City of Shanghai instead of making improvements experienced a food crisis two years after Jiang became the head of the city. Deng Xiaoping had to send to Shanghai the capable Zhu Rongji to help out. On the issue of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Chen suggested bold actions and acted with consistency while Jiang wavered. And while Jiang took a strong stance in closing the liberal Shanghai paper World Economic Herald, he later confided to Zhao Ziyang that the suppression was wrong. Chen believed he should be rewarded with a promotion (from his post as a Politburo member) for having preserved “social order” in Beijing during the student movement. When Jiang was instead promoted, Chen naturally felt it unjust. Chen had a good relationship with Deng, and Deng openly praised Chen as a reformer during his 1992 visit to the Capital Steel Plant. Thus Chen had reason to believe he stood above Jiang. Jiang thus felt that to gain full control of Beijing his greatest obstacle was Chen.
Jiang likes to show off and is by nature a jealous man. If anyone looks down on him he is sure to retaliate. Jiang both hated and feared Chen at the same time. There were many reasons Jiang couldn’t tolerate Chen, the first of which came about when Chen invited Hu Qili, a follower of Zhao Ziyang, to dinner.
After becoming China’s “emperor” Jiang spared no expense at removing anyone who had followed Zhao Ziyang. Jiang believed that the greater he distanced himself from Zhao, the more legitimate would be his position. Jiang’s resistance to Zhao was such that real facts surrounding Zhao and history mattered not. On the day of his inauguration as General Secretary of the CCP, Jiang claimed that he wanted to make up for “the losses” created by Zhao, and never mentioned so much as a word about Zhao’s contributions (during his tenure as Premier and General Secretary) to China’s economic development and political reform.
Jiang knew the Chinese people held a special place in their hearts for Zhao. Zhao’s attitude toward the suppression of the student democracy movement was clearly different from that of many senior politicians and Party members at various levels of government. This gave Zhao an aura of sincerity, as if he spoke for the people and did so without concern for his own personal safety. During Zhao’s time as General Secretary both China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and living standard improved swiftly. Many people were grateful to Zhao on this account. Considering Zhao’s public approval and political achievements, Jiang stood little chance of keeping his post—which he had in effect stolen from Zhao—were Deng to ever ask Zhao to return to power.
After gaining power, Jiang began purging—under the banner of resisting an alleged attempt by the West to quietly change China—reformers and those who had close ties with Zhao. A defiant Chen Xitong, however, went against Jiang’s crusade.
When Zhao fell from power with him went Hu Qili, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Rui Xingwen, the Secretary of the Secretariat of the CCP’s Central Committee. These three were the highest-ranking officials ousted in connection with the Massacre. Rather than try to avoid trouble, Chen arranged a secret meeting with Hu Qili and Wan Li at Capital Hotel. Chen not only attended the meeting but went so far as to greet Hu at the entrance of the building.
Coincidence makes for a story, so one wrinkle in the meeting deserves retelling. Chen thought he had planned everything perfectly. Little could he have expected that it would be the Japanese, of all things, who would leak news of his meeting. It just so happened that on that evening journalists from several Japanese television stations and news agencies, who were stationed in Beijing, had a meeting at the hotel’s Japanese restaurant. One of them by mistake entered Chen’s private room and saw Hu, Wan, and Chen dining and drinking together. Chen mistook the journalist for a Japanese businessman and didn’t pay much heed. The next day, however, the Japanese journalist reported in a Japanese newspaper what he had seen. Three days later the Xinhua News Agency’s internal reference department passed the information to Jiang Zemin in the “Domestic News Summary” section of its internal circular. The affair took Jiang by surprise and triggered much anger. Jiang was surprised, in that the experienced and capable Chen had now joined up with Hu. And angered, in that Chen was clearly going against him by daring to socialize behind his back with Zhao’s followers, whom he most resented. Jiang couldn’t tell whether this was part of a plan by Deng Xiaoping to pave the way, by first reinstating Hu, for Zhao’s return to power. He immediately ordered the Central Disciplinary Committee to investigate the matter further. After the manager at the Capital Hotel confirmed Chen’s meeting, Jiang made a personal call to Chen accusing him of “taking the wrong stand.” Chen gave the excuse that Wan Li had requested the meeting and that he therefore had no choice but to arrange for it.
Jiang didn’t dare to offend Wan, and so had to keep his anger to himself. Deng later did indeed ask Hu to return to his post, thus confirming Wan’s close relationship with followers of Zhao. As Jiang feared more than anything that Zhao would regain power, his resentment of Chen only grew from the incident.
But before Jiang’s lingering resentment could be resolved a new grudge was added. Deng Xiaoping in the spring of 1992 went on his now-famous “Southern Tour” of China. Chen knew all along that Deng’s intention was to further reforms, and thus Chen aired pro-reform slogans amidst programming on Beijing Television and used every opportunity to advocate for reform. This agitated Jiang, who sided with conservative, Leftist senior politicians such as Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. To keep Deng’s unhappiness with him from leaking to the media, Jiang ordered that all coverage of Deng’s tour by state media should follow a “unified reporting standard” dictated by the Ministry of Propaganda. Jiang declared that no reporter could write anything on the matter without his consent.
To Jiang’s surprise, Chen made the first move. Chen had the Beijing Daily, controlled by the Beijing Municipal Government, quickly report the “spirit of Deng Xiaoping’s speech in Southern China.” Acting on Chen’s instructions, the Beijing Daily published Deng’s speech that had first appeared in the Shenzhen Daily. The Beijing Daily published the speech a day earlier than the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the CCP. This put Jiang in a defensive position. To Jiang, Chen’s pro-reform words and actions only highlighted Jiang’s own inflexibility and conservatism. For this Jiang resented Chen even further.
Soon after, Zhou Guanwu, Chairman of Capital Steel’s board, and Chen arranged to have Deng visit Capital Steel. During the visit nobody from the Standing Committee of the Politburo made an appearance. In front of many leaders and workers at Capital Steel, Deng said, “As for the things that I have said recently, some people are listening and some aren’t. Beijing has mobilized itself, but some in the central government still refuse to act.” Deng asked Chen to “pass the word” to the CCP Central Committee that, “Whoever opposes the policies of the CCP’s 13th National Congress will have to step down.” Upon hearing Deng’s words Jiang shuddered, almost as if thunder was rolling overhead.
Fear-stricken, Jiang then went through the Central Committee’s General Office to blame Chen for failing to notify him of Deng’s visit in advance. Chen retorted that the General Office should seek information on Deng’s activities from Deng’s office itself, rather than blaming Beijing. Rebuffed and angered, Jiang grew more determined still to remove Chen.
When Chen had been mayor of Beijing, Jiang was the Party Secretary of Shanghai. Chen was thus, as the leader of Beijing, much better informed than Jiang. Jiang was well aware that Chen had a good relationship with Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng. In those days Jiang was thus all smiles whenever he met Chen. During his first two years as General Secretary of the Party, Jiang would mind his behavior and at least show respect towards Li Peng. But after the Yang brothers were removed from their positions at the Party’s 14th Congress, Jiang grew increasingly more arrogant.
Chen witnessed the changes in Jiang and knew that his meeting with Hu Qili and his actions in regards to Deng’s Southern Tour had made him an enemy. In Chen’s judgment, Jiang was the type of person who absolutely couldn’t let someone off the hook, even over the most minor of provocations. He had heard of Jiang’s retaliation against the students who challenged him during the 1986 student movement in Shanghai. So it was that Chen now hoped to, having offended Jiang and wishing to protect himself, have Jiang removed from his post while Deng was still alive.
Thus in early 1995 Chen reported on Jiang in a letter to Deng co-signed by seven provincial Party heads. The content of the letter is yet unknown to the outside world. Deng didn’t make any comment after reading the letter and handed it off to Bo Yibo to handle. Prior to the Tiananmen Massacre, when the eight senior politicians had discussed the issue of Zhao Ziyang’s successor, Deng had wanted to pick Li Ruihuan or Qiao Shi. It was Bo Yibo who had strongly backed Jiang Zemin. Deng had reached an old age by that time and lacked the energy to change the General Secretary; were it otherwise he would have done so upon returning from his 1992 tour. Deng’s passing of Chen’s letter to Bo Yibo was meant to suggest what kind of person Deng recommended for the post—somebody different from whom Bo would or did choose, that is.
Bo was notorious among high-ranking officials for his maltreatment of others, opportunism, ingratitude, and duplicity. A demonstration of this was Bo’s relationship with Hu Yaobang. In 1979, a few years after the Cultural Revolution, Bo was rehabilitated and released from prison thanks to Hu. Later, at the 4th Plenary of the Central Committee of the 11th Party Congress, Bo, again thanks to Hu’s endorsement, became a member of the Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, a State Councilor, and Deputy Director of the CCP Advisory Committee. However, on Jan. 15, 1987, while at an extended meeting of the Politburo that he chaired, it was none other than Bo who urged Hu to step down.
After reading the accusatory letter from Chen, Bo, instead of investigating Jiang further, grew happy that he had something he could hold against Jiang. The letter, he believed, now gave him means to manipulate Jiang’s power. Bo could now blackmail Jiang into promoting his son, Bo Xilai, along with Bo’s trusted circle of friends.
Bo then summoned Jiang to his side and handed him the letter, not saying a word. Jiang began to sweat and turned pale upon reading the accusatory letter, visibly shaken. Reportedly he even began to tremble. Jiang pleaded with Bo to pitch in a few good words to Deng on his behalf, allowing him to keep his post as General Secretary. Bo replied that he would do his best. He then instructed Jiang that Jiang must remove Chen Xitong in order to avoid later trouble, and that he should begin with those positioned around Chen. Jiang emphatically nodded “yes.” Son Bo Xilai’s rapid advance through the ranks of power a few years later stemmed solely from this affair—that is, his father’s special relationship with Jiang.
2. Bringing Down Chen Xitong
At the 4th Plenary of the Central Committee of the 14th Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping transferred all of his powers to Jiang Zemin. Jiang felt that the time to bring down Chen Xitong had arrived. All that was needed now was an opportunity. Chen’s accusatory letter of early 1995 made Jiang feel that he had to act immediately.
Zeng Qinghong advised Jiang that after senior Party members passed away their children would band together and form factions, the result of which could be a threat to Jiang’s power. This never was a legitimate cause for concern, however, in that the offspring of China’s top officials were busy making fortunes by way of loopholes in the current policies. As long as Jiang held aloft the banner of “fighting corruption,” the royal offspring would swear their allegiance so as to avoid punishment and prosecution from police, the judiciary, and the Central Disciplinary Commission.
Jiang planned to strengthen his power base by deploying not only sons Jiang Mianheng and Jiang Miankang, but also extended family and relatives, to various central ministries and local governments after the 14th Party Congress. Jiang had to wait, however, until his political opponents had been purged in the name of fighting corruption. There would be plenty of vacant positions for relatives after opponents had been purged and the supposed “anti-corruption” campaign had come to a close.
Jiang made up his mind, and as Bo Yibo had suggested, he decided to start the purge with one of Beijing’s deputy mayors. After careful consideration Jiang made Wang Baosen his target.
In 1995 the former Chairman of Capital Steel’s board, Zhou Guanwu, fell from power owing to financial misconduct. His son, Zhou Beifang, was arrested and put in prison. A case of bribery involving secretaries in the Beijing Municipal government was exposed, and Wang, the Deputy Mayor at the time, was found dead. His death occurred in April on Qifengcha Mountain in Huairou County, near Beijing. Authorities claimed that Wang had taken his own life with a bullet. In reality, however, the footprints, wounds, gunpowder, and a bullet shell found at the scene all pointed to murder rather than suicide. One obvious piece of evidence was that at first only the bullet was found at the scene; the bullet shell, not found at first, had been pounded into the ground and was found only later with the help of police who employed a mine detector. Furthermore, the place where Wang died was remote and rarely visited by people. After the body was found the scene was made off-limits. The fact that the bullet shell had been pounded into the ground could mean only that somebody else was present at the time of Wang’s death. According to internal information obtained from the National Security Bureau, that “somebody” was a secret agent from the bureau, sent by Jiang.
Chen panicked after Wang’s death. The conventions of CCP officialdom have it that how something is to be reported depends fully on the top leader’s likings. Since China’s Central TV station widely broadcast Wang’s death, it meant that a power struggle at the top, launched by Jiang, had begun. The sentencing of Zhou Beifang prompted Deng Xiaoping to contemplate what would happen after he passed away. Were he to clash with Jiang, his children stood to become the target of Jiang’s purgings. Now several months after submitting his accusation letter, Chen saw that Jiang was still in power, indicating that Deng had no intention of changing horses mid-stride. Chen knew well the peril he was in.
Jiang made an all out effort to take down Chen. Ultimately what he used to incriminate Chen was the claim that: “Between July 1991 and November 1994, in his official functions with foreigners, Chen accepted 22 expensive gifts (eight gold and silver items, six expensive watches, four expensive fountain pens, three cameras, and one video camera) totaling 555,000 yuan [about US$67,700].” For a leader at the Politburo level such as Chen, the charge was really nothing in effect; a person could even make the case he was relatively clean. Even so, Chen was put in prison on these grounds and sentenced to 13 years for corruption plus four years for neglect of professional duty. Chen was sentenced, in total, to a 17-year prison term.
At the end of 2003 Chen was released on bail so that he might undergo treatment for bladder cancer. Upon his release, Chen wrote a 5,000-word plea letter in which he accused Jiang of persecuting him politically and claimed that he was the victim of a power struggle. He also accused Jiang and his sons of financial crimes. Chen said that he had once had a business partnership with Jiang, and knew from this that one of Jiang’s sons, Mianheng, had illegally transferred 15 million yuan (US$1.83 million) of state funds. This was perhaps all Chen could reveal to media at the time. To know more we must, regrettably, wait for the day when Chen can speak freely to media.
Today even ordinary citizens know that Jiang’s crusade against corruption was merely a pretext, a weapon, in a prolonged power struggle. One need only look at China’s top power brokers of today to see this: among them are the thoroughly-corrupt Jia Qinglin, Huang Ju, and Chen Liangyu, each of whom is marked by a history of wrongdoing. Not one of them has a clean record. The CCP’s corruption has penetrated every level of the system, top to bottom.
3. The Taiwan Strait Crisis
Around New Years of 1995–1996 the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted in full. On March 23 of that year, Taiwan held its first democratic election. Along with victor Li Denghui, presidential candidates included non-partisan figures Chen Lu'an and Lin Yanggang as well as Democratic Progressive Party candidate Peng Mingmin.
Jiang was terribly worried over Taiwan’s holding of elections. He was afraid that the reverberations of a democratic election in Taiwan would stir longings for democracy in mainland China. Thus in order to diminish the likelihood of democratic elections in China, the CCP, represented by Jiang, concocted a host of rather farfetched ideas, claiming things such as that the conditions of the nation and the “quality” of its citizens were not in keeping with the standards necessary for democratic elections; another was that traditional Chinese culture was not fit for democratic elections. Yet Taiwan and mainland China share the same culture and are of the same ethnic heritage, being connected by flesh and blood. Once the elections in Taiwan met with success, this fact itself was enough to negate the CCP’s claim that mainland China was unfit for democracy. It was on this account that Jiang—a dictator who usurped state power without election—burned with anxiety.
Jiang gave a speech at the beginning of 1995, titled “Further advance the great cause of unity in the motherland,” which was later referred to by the outside world as “Jiang’s eight points.” It can be said that the “eight points” lacked any form of new insight. At the time, the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland was not tense, what with Hong Kong was about to return to China. The driving force behind things was Jiang’s wish to achieve something involving relations between the mainland and Taiwan; he sought to be credited some day in China’s history books. Jiang was mediocre and bumbling at best in matters of foreign affairs and internal governance of China, and he was bereft of innovation. His predicament is summed up well by the Chinese idiom, “He who doesn’t have diamond tools should not promise the fine work of chinaware.” The result of Jiang’s ambitions was thus not only the ruining of precious chinaware but the near outbreak of war.
Li Denghui had been practicing pragmatic diplomacy ever since becoming Taiwan’s president in 1988. For example, he made a “vacation” trip to Singapore in 1989, and visited the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand in 1994. Jiang was wary of Li’s goal of promoting international recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nation. The most insufferable event for Jiang was Li’s private visit to Cornell University, in New York State, made as an alumnus in May 1995. Li’s visit was approved by the U.S. Government under pressure from both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Li gave a speech at Cornell titled, “The desire of the people often occupies my heart,” in which he expressed his democratic ideals. Li then went one step further by preparing to hold Taiwan’s first presidential election. Jiang in return, incited by senior army commanders, decided to flex his muscles. [1] But to this we shall return shortly.
Jiang had been cautious up to that time about holding military drills, for though he was China’s top military man he lacked even the most basic of military experience. Nor had he ever led a battle, let alone directed a war. In military affairs he was a total outsider. His biggest “military thought” was probably “emphasizing politics,” the purpose being to instill in the army loyalty and obedience. Facing pressure from the military, Jiang thus needed to assign a leader—ideally someone who was a die-hard follower and trusted subordinate. Jiang thus thought of the Military Commission’s Vice-Chairman, Zhang Wannian.
4. Jiang’s Military Representative
Zhang Wannian’s promotion was dramatic. When Jiang inspected the Jinan Military Region in 1992, Zhang was the regional Commander. Zhang wished not to miss any chance to show Jiang his loyalty and devotion, even shouting aloud slogans such as “Firmly support the Party Central Committee and Central Military Commission with Jiang Zemin as its center.” The implication was that Jiang was the center of not only the Party Central Committee but also the Military Commission.
Jiang’s position in the Party was not stable at that time. He urgently needed to raise trusted followers within the military. Even though Jiang and Zhang Aiping had a close relationship, and the Third Field Army led by Zhang Aiping didn’t like the Yang brothers, they didn’t necessarily care much for Jiang still. Jiang, for his part, felt like a junior in the presence of “father figure” type senior commanders and couldn’t manage to order them around. Only someone who could truly take orders from Jiang could be his key military man, he knew.
The slogan Zhang Wannian had shouted out made Jiang ecstatic. Upon returning to Beijing, Jiang immediately promoted Zhang to the position of General Chief of Staff of the Central Military Commission. Then in 1993 he promoted Zhang to the rank of full General. Zhang didn’t disappoint Jiang. He once gathered his entire personnel in the chief of staff office and ordered them to sing, in front of Jiang, the song “The gun will forever obey the Party’s command.” Jiang couldn’t have been happier. The song, adapted from a Mao Zedong quote, was tantamount to saying “power will forever follow Chairman Jiang’s command.”
Zhang’s flattery proved quite effective, and people soon began to follow in his footsteps, benefiting in kind. Yu Yongpo was one such figure. Flattering Jiang without letup, Yu in 1992 was named Director of the General Political Department of China’s military and later, in 1993, given the rank of General. At the beginning of 2001, at a banquet Jiang hosted at the Huairentang Hall in the Zhongnanhai compound meant to entertain the entire top brass military, Yu Yongpo shouted out “Long live Chairman Jiang!” The move made him something of a laughing stock, though it was not seen as such by Jiang.
Another master of flattery was Guo Boxiong. Guo was an army commander and Major General in the 47th Army. In the early 1990s Jiang went to inspect Shanxi Province. Along the way he visited the 47th Army. Jiang usually likes to nap after a full meal. Knowing this, Guo saw an opportunity too good to pass up. After Jiang dined one meal, Guo dismissed the soldier outside of Jiang’s door and stood guard himself. Jiang slept for over two hours, which drove Guo to new depths of boredom. Yet Guo didn’t dare to leave to so much as use the bathroom for fear that when Jiang awoke he might miss, for lack of fortitude, his golden opportunity. After Jiang awoke he stepped out of his room and was pleased to see a soldier standing guard. He wondered to himself why this soldier was so old. He took a second look and saw that it was none other than Major General Guo Boxiong! No Major General had ever stood guard for him before, and so Jiang took an instant liking to Guo. Guo was soon transferred to the Beijing Military Region to become a Vice Commander. After that he was promoted three times, becoming at one point the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and being awarded the rank of full General.
It was facing a Military Chairman such as this and commanders of this nature that Taiwan’s Li Denghui didn’t take seriously China’s threats.
