Jiang Zemin’s days are numbered. It is only a question of when, not if, the former head of the Chinese Communist Party will be arrested. Jiang officially ran the Chinese regime for more than a decade, and for another decade he was the puppet master behind the scenes who often controlled events. During those decades Jiang did incalculable damage to China. At this moment when Jiang’s era is about to end, Epoch Times here republishes in serial form “Anything for Power: The Real Story of Jiang Zemin,” first published in English in 2011. The reader can come to understand better the career of this pivotal figure in today’s China.
Chapter 10: Indulgence and Corruption Pervade the Armed Forces; Desires Bring Ruin to the “Great Iron Wall” (1998)
Jiang Zemin knew very well that he had no prestige or qualifications in the military. Most senior military leaders had fought on the battlefield. And most had solid connections with other military leaders, which particularly Jiang lacked. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping once commanded large military forces and had earned the respect of China’s servicemen. In contrast, Jiang lacked not only the political background each had but also their experience in the military. Never had he so much as laid his hands on a gun.
In most normal modern societies a ruling party can only form a government by means of democratic elections. The different voices in society serve to monitor the ruling political party’s administrative authority. Poor management of the government can mean impeachment or removal from office. The military in these countries belongs to the state and not to any political party. The military’s mission is to safeguard the people’s interests and defend the country’s borders. Thus, neither conflicts among political parties nor internal conflict within any one party generally involves the military. Irrespective of which party’s candidate is elected, the military’s loyalty to the nation and obedience to the command of the nation’s highest authoritative organization as stipulated by the constitution are imperative. This is one reason democratic countries can remain politically stable despite having what are at times heated debates and tensions among parties.
However, China’s military is different from that of nations in the West. In reality, China’s only military is of the CCP and not of the nation itself. Thus the military serves as a tool of the Party as it seeks to benefit itself. The Chinese Communist Party has always emphasized that Party branches are to be established at the level of the company. Going back some time, Mao Zedong postulated the formula that “The Party commands the gun.” In other words, he who has the upper hand in controlling the military will decidedly be the victor in any intra-Party political struggle. If military power is not within one’s grasp, one’s political future lies in the hands of others.
So it was that Jiang Zemin was deeply concerned. But Jiang had his own means to control the military.
1. Promoting Officials to Gain Their Allegiance
Promotion in the military is an important matter. It is granted for meritorious achievements such as labor on bloody battlefields and protecting citizens’ homes and the welfare of the nation.
During Mao’s time, those who were made marshals and generals had surmounted untold dangers before achieving their prominent ranks. Promoted individuals would cherish the promotion and feel dignified by it. Servicemen knew that during peaceful times, times when there were few opportunities to demonstrate strength, promotion to the rank of General was no easy thing. However, under Jiang’s rule this would change, as sycophancy quickly became a shortcut to promotion in the military. The promotions of Zhang Wannian, Guo Boxiong, and You Xigui—each the product of favoritism rather than military accomplishments—are widely known among the military. The most extreme case is that of Commander Major-General Guo Boxiong of the 47th military unit. Guo was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Military Commission for merely standing guard for Jiang during the leader’s afternoon nap.
Since the restoration of the military’s ranking system in 1988, the Central Military Commission (CMC) has appointed 96 high-ranking officers to the military and police ranks of General. Alongside the 17 high-ranking officers who were appointed Generals by Deng Xiaoping on Sept. 14, 1988, the other 79 Generals were appointed by Jiang between 1993 and 2004. As for Major Generals and Lieutenant Generals, hundreds were made thus in Jiang’s era—almost as if the move was part of a casual game.
On June 7, 1993, Jiang awarded six high-ranking officers the military rank of General. One year later, on June 8, 1994, Jiang conferred titles to 19 Generals in succession.
On Jan. 23, 1996, in a whimsical moment, Jiang said to those around him, “Today, let’s promote several people to General for our own enjoyment. What do you think?” Those around him were largely sycophants, and so their answer was a sure affirmation. Immediately Jiang conferred four persons with the rank of General. It was that day that Political Commissioner Sui Yongju of the Second Artillery Corps rose from Lieutenant General to the rank of General.
On Oct. 24, 1997—in one single day—Jiang promoted 152 people to General. Children of former high-ranking officials and those with family connections were specifically targeted by Jiang for support. For example, He Long’s son, He Pengfei, was enlisted in the military only after the collapse of the Gang of Four in 1976. He had served in the military for less than 20 years, yet in just one promotion he became Vice Admiral Deputy Commander. By as early as 1997 Jiang had conferred 530 persons with the ranks of General, Lieutenant General, or Major General.
On March 27, 1998, the CMC held a ceremony to promote 10 high-ranking military and police officers to the rank of General. On Sept. 29, 1999, two were promoted to positions as Generals and on June 21, 2000, the CMC held a ceremony to promote 16 high-ranking military and police officers to the rank of General.
On June 2, 2002, seven people were promoted to the rank of General. Senior military cadres were said to be indignant upon witnessing Jiang, during the televised ceremony, using only one hand to present the certificates of promotion to the recipients. They remarked, “Jiang Zemin doesn’t even know the most basic protocol. This is not solemn at all.”
On June 20, 2004, just before Jiang stepped down from office, he promoted 15 military and police officers to the rank of General, among whom was his trusted follower You Xigui.
Many of those conferred so flippantly with rankings and titles didn’t regard the designation as the honor it was supposed to be. They knew in their hearts that such promotional honors were not dispensed according to their merits, but rather purely as prize—a prize meant to create allegiance. It for this reason they took the honors lightly and conducted themselves in a manner anything but serious at the award ceremonies.
The promotion of veteran generals in the past was based on abilities, and recipients enjoyed immense prestige; their commands were met with uniform obedience. Now, however, officials will use whatever means possible to gain promotion. They have little respect for one another, they slander one another, create obstacles for one another’s work, refuse to cooperate, are jealous of each other, and undermine one another. One might ask: what sort of might could the military achieve with people of such caliber? A military of this sort won’t manage to win battles no matter how modernized their weapons may be.
2. Leniency on Smuggling and Graft
The military’s entrepreneurial activities started in the mid 1980s. [1] The initial objective was to offset the military’s expenditures. Senior officials of the CCP were optimistic as to the endeavor’s potential and commended it for “sustaining the military within the military.” Some senior military figures, such as Yang Shangkun and Wang Zhen, frequently wrote messages, slogans, or names in their own calligraphy for the military enterprises in a show of encouragement. After Jiang Zemin became Chairman of the Military Commission, he took advantage of his authority and loopholes in the military enterprises so as to gain full control of the military. Jiang gave many undue benefits to soldiers, allowing the military to wantonly indulge in trading, and fostering corruption within its ranks. Jiang figured that, should these people become insatiably greedy, what with all their embezzling, they would come to rely on him, and feel grateful. Contrary to what he expected, however, problems spiraled out of control: never before was the military so corrupt. Smuggling by the navy on China’s southwestern seaboard became more rampant than pirating, while smuggling by the army in the north grew worse than that of bandits.
At a meeting on smuggling, Premier Zhu Rongji said that in just the first six months of 1998, guns and artillery formerly belonging to the military had killed 450 customs staff, police, and other law enforcement personnel, while injuring another 2,200. The military also used its meteorological observatory for its own private purposes, forged the Premier’s signature, and stamped documents using the seal of the Military Commission’s Vice Chairman so as to fraudulently withdraw some 2 billion yuan (US$230 million). Incredibly, all of these matters were covered up upon being brought to Jiang’s attention. The problems China faced in the form of pirates, gangs, and corrupt local officials now paled in comparison to the activities of the military.
On July 26, 1998, the North Sea Fleet of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Navy sent four artillery ships, two submarine chasers, and a 4,000 ton military transport ship to escort four oil tankers that were smuggling oil from northern Europe. The oil tankers were filled with 70,000 tons of refined oil.
Every coincidence tells a story, of course. The oil tankers crossed the path of 12 counter-smuggling patrol boats that had been sent by the Ministry of Public Security and China’s Customs General Administration. The counter-smuggling gunboat shouted to the navy, asking it to cooperate with the inspection. The navy replied, “You shouldn’t act rashly unless you have orders from the Central Military Commission and the Naval Headquarters!”
The confrontation came to a standstill for about 15 minutes, during which the Navy, still escorting the smuggling oil tankers, urgently sought instructions from its land-based leaders. Superiors were afraid to make the decision, however, so the Naval officers sought instructions from senior military officials in Beijing. They received a simple and straightforward order, with not an ounce of ambiguity: “Fire at them, fire till they’re destroyed!”
One of the four artillery ships quickly aimed its cannons at the control vessel of the Customs and Public Security Ministry and fired several rounds of ammunition. Almost simultaneously, the Navy’s transport ship and three other artillery ships advanced at full speed towards and rammed into the Customs’s patrol boats. The battle lasted a full 59 minutes. The confrontation, which took place in the Huanghai Sea, resulted in 87 deaths and injuries. Despite the casualties no punishment was meted out to anyone involved.
Ironically, among the unfortunate 13 souls from the Customs and Public Security Ministry that were lost that day, was one surnamed Deng. He was the fifth generation descendent of Deng Shichang, a national hero in the Qing Dynasty navy who fought and died in the Naval Battle of 1894—a fight which took place in the same area of the sea.
On July 13, 1998, at a CCP Central Committee meeting Premier Zhu Rongji confirmed that the United Front Work Department had smuggled 10,000 cars into China and shared the 2.32 billion yuan (US$267 million) in profit from it with the Political Consultative Conference and Party Leadership Group. The military is the largest player amongst all contingents involved in smuggling. At the national workshop on smuggling in September 1998, Zhu said that in recent years the total annual amount smuggled amounted to 800 billion yuan, of which the military accounted for the majority—at least 500 billion. At the 33 percent tax rate then in place, tax evasion came out to roughly 160 billion. The money was not used to subsidize the military, but instead, some 80 percent of it went into the pockets of military officials at various levels.
There was no product that the military would not smuggle. Even narcotics were not excluded. According to a March 28, 2001, BBC News account, the National Security Adviser of the Philippines, Roilo Golez, said that the Chinese military personnel were running operations producing illegal drugs in five provinces of eastern China. These plants supplied US$1.2 billion worth of methamphetamines to the Philippines every year. Golez expressed a wish that China would cease shipments of narcotics into the Philippines. He said that if drug smuggling from China could be reduced by 50 percent, the Philippines would solve half of its narcotics problems. Later the government of the Philippines repeatedly sent representatives to Beijing to discuss and protest the ongoing drug smuggling and operations by China’s military. A military led by Jiang Zemin.
Smuggling by the military was simply a shortcut for military officials to get rich. Another shortcut was profiteering from military enterprises.
One captain at a missile launching camp in the Nanjing Military Region set up the Yixing Chinese People’s Great Wall Corporation. He obtained a large bank loan by offering liberal shares of his illicit proceeds. Thus it was that a mere captain was able to embezzle a stunning 300 million yuan. Other examples abound. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Military Commission, Dong Liangju, had nine luxurious villas built in national scenic spots around the country, and this, alongside owning 15 luxury cars. The commander of the Guangdong Military Region used funds embezzled from economic entities to buy six garden villas and four luxury cars. The vice president of the Military Academy of Sciences imported US$120,000 worth of interior decor materials from Italy. The deputy commander of the Second Artillery Corps arranged for his family to shop in Europe and America, to the tune of US$250,000. When seven military officials from the Guangdong Military Region moved residences, they spent US$1.2 million merely on bathroom renovations; on average each household spent US$180,000 on sanitary equipment imported from Italy.
In November 1998, the Minister of Defense and Vice Chairman of China’s CMC, Chi Haotian, said at a Military Commission and Military Discipline Inspection Commission meeting in Xishan, Beijing, that “Since 1994, 80 percent of the assets and profits generated by the military’s economic entities have been embezzled and divided amongst senior and middle-level officials. Every year senior and middle-level officials have spent 50 percent of the entire expenses of the military on food and drinks, overseas tours, luxury homes, and luxury cars.”
In 1998, the military spent a total of 131 billion yuan in budgeted and unbudgeted expenses, making that 50 percent figure around 65.5 billion in illicit expenditures. Moreover, the public funds embezzled from military-operated economic entities amounted to 186.4 billion. In other words, the total amount squandered by military officials was, shockingly, two times the military’s 1998 budget of 94 billion. By the end of March 1999, the Military Procuratorate had recorded 2,170 major cases of corruption, diversion of public funds, and public funds absconded to overseas. That year alone 24 Major Generals or senior officials fled overseas, bringing with them enormous amounts of embezzled public funds.
Under the leadership of CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin, generals of all levels busied themselves jockeying for promotions and laundering money.
Zhu Rongji noticed that the military’s business operations were disrupting the normal economic order of things. In 1996 he thus proposed that the military cease its entrepreneurial activities, only to find that his proposal garnered no support. The problem then worsened. In 1998 Zhu felt that the problem should continue no further, and thus, once again, brought up the matter with Jiang, asking in strong terms that the military’s business activities be ceased.
Finally, in July 1998, in the “National Counter-¬Smuggling Working Conference,” Jiang announced that the military, paramilitary police, and judicial and public security systems were no longer allowed to engage in entrepreneurial operations. The systems were to disengage themselves by the end of December 1998, transferring all such operations to local governments in China.
Although Jiang was taking a different stance than he initially had—no longer allowing the military to engage in business activities—his motive was the same as it always was. In his book The Man Who Changed China, Robert Kuhn makes much fanfare of Jiang’s banning of the military’s entrepreneurial activities, making it out to be something of a great accomplishment. But in so doing Kuhn turns the truth inside out.
Jiang’s initial motive for allowing the military involvement in business activities was to foster a corrupt environment in which he could more easily build a following and wantonly confer military titles. He needed a military that didn’t emphasize formal training or the strengthening of military prowess. And it was the resultant mess—a corrupt military—that gave the inexperienced CMC Chairman fertile soil for fostering his own faction.
With time Jiang grew afraid, however, that the military’s business operations would make it more independent—something detrimental to Jiang’s exertion of control over it. Thus he wished to sever its sources of income so that the military would have no choice but to depend on him for the allocation of funds and would have to then, in turn, obey his orders. Banning the military’s business activities was a way out for Jiang. And what’s more, it was a prime chance to boost his authority in the military. Jiang had become confident by that point, having nurtured his faction in the military for years. Jiang held in his hands all the top political positions, what with Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing having fallen and Deng Xiaoping having passed away. Thus Jiang, at the insistence of Zhu Rongji, finally made his decision to put a stop to the military’s business activities. The move came only after careful deliberation over whether it would benefit or harm Jiang personally.
Just to play it safe, however, Jiang resorted to his usual tactics. He asked Hu Jintao, who was fifth in rank in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, to handle the thorny issue; this allowed Jiang to hide out behind the scenes. At the time Hu was neither a vice chairman nor a committee member of the Military Commission, nor a vice-premier. He was responsible only for CCP affairs. Hu thus had to brace himself and snatch profits from the military’s jaws. Jiang had always regarded Hu as a thorn in his side, as Hu was personally appointed by Deng as Jiang’s successor. For this reason Jiang would ask Hu to act on his behalf whenever difficult issues arose. In name, he was providing Hu with “training opportunities.” In reality, had the military reacted with radical means or chosen to obstruct things, the arrangement meant that Jiang would not be held directly responsible. Hu would be the scapegoat. And along with that Jiang could potentially strip Hu of his “successor” title. The tactic was used by Jiang several times, in fact. Hu, who is by nature discreet, was fortunate not to encounter any mishaps in the years before he assumed office.
Among the 20,000 military enterprises then existing, by the end of 1998 less than 5,000 had completed or nearly completed the transfer of business activities to local governments. As the military enterprises were independent enterprises with independent accounting units and many special privileges, they had no involvement with local industry or commerce and revenue departments. The recording of assets, distribution, and profit was terribly disorderly. Even when local governments wanted to check the accounting practices of such entities, the task was daunting: whenever the military’s vested interests were involved, military officials would create problems and obstacles, or feign compliance, making it extremely hard to audit their accounts. Furthermore, excessive probing could be labeled “meddling with military secrets.” The local government could only conduct the verification in a perfunctory manner, as too much investigation would benefit no one. Ultimately the effort to disengage the military from commercial activities was abandoned.
