The Games went on and hundreds of world leaders flocked to Beijing and gave the regime a big boost. PRC clearly understood that if it did not promise to improve human rights, the IOC likely would not make a decision in favor of Beijing. However once the decision is made, keeping the promise is no longer important.

When the PRC applied for entry to the World Trade Organization, it gave many pledges to open its markets. However, once it became a full-fledged member, the pledges were simply neglected. Up until today, governments and corporations have been able to do nothing to make the PRC honor its word.

A rogue is also a bully. If you play nice with him, he will not reciprocate but even become more aggressive. During President Obama’s 2009 trip to China, he chose not to criticize its bad human rights record as a friendly gesture in exchange for Beijing’s cooperation on issues such as global energy and climate change.

Clearly Beijing just didn’t get it. Later at the year-end United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, as heads of state from two dozen countries, including U.S. President Obama, U.K’s prime minister Gordon Brown, and other world leaders, were meeting, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao sent a second-tier official in the foreign ministry to sit opposite Obama.

As the U.K’s newspaper Guardian described the scene, “the diplomatic snub was obvious and brutal, as was the practical implication: several times during the session, the world’s most powerful heads of state were forced to wait around as the Chinese delegate went off to make telephone calls to his ’superiors.'”

A rogue will also use deceptive tricks to gain an advantage. For example, after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the PRC became a lone wolf in the international community. Facing worldwide criticism and economic sanctions, it came up with an idea and struck a deal with many Western governments to carry on a human rights dialogue behind closed doors.

The PRC’s view is that criticizing the PRC’s human rights is fine, but please do it quietly. Many governments were thus trapped. As a result, talks were nicely done, beautiful promises were made, the international criticism subdued, and the PRC continued business as usual.

Whenever the PRC is pressured on human rights, or before a U.S. president visits China, the PRC usually releases a political prisoner to show “improvement,” although U.S. officials may actually take the gesture as a diplomatic success. After releasing one prisoner, the PRC can immediately arrest hundreds more, once the media spotlight turns elsewhere.

Fourth, engaging with the rulers instead of the people of China. The U.S. has consistently engaged with Chinese state officials and Communist Party cadres, not the Chinese people.

Engaging with officials may not be a mistake when dealing with a democratically elected government, where there is no huge conflict between the people and the government. But the situation is different in the case of China. The regime controlled by the Party is not legitimate and does not represent the people.

None of the U.S. Presidents has ever met in person with political dissidents or oppressed groups during their visits in China. In the past decades, much of the State Department’s funds for promoting democracy have been funneled through the Chinese government.

Between both governments, there are a wide range of established mechanisms of contacts and exchanges: summits for heads of states, high level strategic dialogues, state-provincial governorship meetings, and regular conferences of the political parties of both countries.

However, between the U.S. government and Chinese people, especially those who are suppressed by the PRC regime, there is almost zero regular engagement.

By making friends with the Chinese people, the United States can benefit in two ways:

First, by allying with the Chinese people, the United States is embracing the most powerful weapon for containing the PRC. The Chinese Communist most fears two things on earth: the U.S. government and the Chinese people.

A main reason why Beijing put economic development in the center of its national policy is to use economic growth to justify its continued rule, in the eyes of 1.3 billion people. While Beijing continues to suppress the Chinese people, it tries very hard to win their devotion by handing out monetary and material benefits.

In fact, most of the Chinese people do not belong to the ruling class and have been subject to various forms of persecution by the Communist Party. If the U.S. government could wholeheartedly help them and stand firmly for their freedom, rights, and beliefs, the United States would win their support.

However, if the United States fails to show its support for the people but instead makes friends with those who persecute them, the Chinese people would also see this and might give up on the United States.

Second, no matter how the political situation in China evolves, the future of China belongs to the 1.3 billion people. Engaging with them is to engage with the future of China, thus ensuring U.S. long-term strategic interests in Asia.

The Arab Spring gave fresh lessons. The U.S. had adopted a similar engagement policy with Egypt by befriending the regime’s dictator and viewing him as a U.S. ally in the Middle East.

In March 2009, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Egypt and the media asked her whether human rights violations by the Egyptian government would interfere with Mubarak’s visit to the White House, she replied, “It is not in any way connected … I really consider President and Mrs. Mubarak to be friends of my family. So I hope to see him often here in Egypt and in the United States.”

In early 2011, people of Egypt took to the streets to overthrow the Mubarak regime, putting the United States in an awkward situation. After Mubarak stepped down, major political groups in the country have embraced anti-American sentiments.

Fifth, treating freedom and human rights as mere decorations for US China policy. The U.S. government has explicitly set human rights and freedom as a much lower priority than trade and the economy, when dealing with China.

The semiannual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialog, attended by top cabinet members and policy heavy weights, clearly outweighs the biennial U.S.-China Human Rights Dialog, led only by a State Department assistant secretary.

What Went Wrong With US China Policy

Adverse Selection and the Trust Crisis in China