Read the series here: Unbridled Evil
Chapter Six: The West Enables the China ‘Miracle’ (Part II)
Section 4: Jiang Gives Away Chinese Territory- The Communists Offer Market Access With Qualms, the West Accepts Trading with Communist China CCP Exploits Its Buying Power to Great Advantage
- Opposition to Universal Values Closed-Door Human Rights Dialogs Beijing Beats Back Human Rights Criticism
Section 4: Jiang Gives Away Chinese Territory
The Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress was held in Beijing, Sept. 16–19, 2004. After several rounds of bargaining and infighting within the top circle of the Party, Jiang was finally forced to step down.Zhong Guo Ren believed that there were three major takeaways from this giveaway. First, it showed that the CCP was even worse than the Nationalists (China’s government pre-1949), who the CCP had been ridiculing for years for selling out the country. Second, it showed Jiang Zemin himself was more willing to sell out than other Party leaders on this issue. Third, it marked that the government formally and officially abandoned a huge territory, while keeping the Chinese public in the dark during the whole process of the negotiation.
On April 22, 2005, Ching Cheong was taken away by Chinese state security agents while he was in Shenzhen. On August 5, Ching Cheong was formally arrested under the charge of espionage. The authorities claimed that he had collected intelligence on mainland China for Taiwan since 2000. On Aug. 31, 2006, Ching was sentenced to five years in prison. On Feb. 5, 2008, Ching was released on parole and returned to Hong Kong, with the help of a lot of people. During his detention period, he was told, “You may never know the real reason for the arrest.” Throughout the whole trial, no one ever questioned what secrets he had supposedly “stolen” or “leaked.”
In this treaty, Jiang Zemin sold the territory of more than one million square kilometers, equivalent to the sum of three northeastern provinces of China, or dozens of Taiwan. Jiang Zemin also gave the estuary of Tumen River to Russia, and cut off the China Northeast gateway to the Sea of Japan. In North China, Jiang gave away several large pieces of territory, including 600,000 square kilometers between the south of Stanovoy Range and north of Heilongjiang, 400,000 square kilometers to the east of the Ussuri River, as well as the 170,000 square kilometers of Tannu Uriankhai region and 76,400 square kilometers of Sakhalin Island.
The treaty completely denied the Treaty of Nerchinsk (尼布楚条约) signed by Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty with Russia in 1689. It acknowledged many unequal Sino-Russian Treaties that had been denied by every previous government of China ever since the Republic of China was established in 1911, including the Treaty of Aigun (瑷珲条约) and the Sino-Russia Treaty of Beijing (中俄北京条约). Moreover, the treaty permanently gave away large areas which had been usurped by Russia without signing any documents, such as the Tannu Uriankhai region and Sakhalin Island.
After signing the agreement, Jiang Zemin, then Chairman of the Central Military Commission, ordered the Chinese border guards to retreat, leaving 500 kilometers of undefended area, while Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan only allowed the undefended zone of 100 kilometers (except a few areas in Russia’s Primorye).
By giving away large areas of Chinese territory, Jiang did gain political support from the Russian government in return. For example, the Russian government forced the chairman of Falun Dafa Association in Russia to leave the country, and deported Chinese Falun Gong practitioners living in Russia back to China without consideration of their personal safety. China must have brought pressure on Russia in the deportations and other actions against Falun Gong practitioners, although it is unclear whether it had anything to do with the Boris Yeltsin and Jiang signing of a treaty on Dec. 9, 1999, a little over four months after the persecution began.
In addition to Russia, China also has territory disputes with Vietnam, India, and some former Soviet countries. The Chinese media never publicized the contents of the treaties involved and deals were signed under the table.
Jiang Zemin signed border demarcation agreements with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, basically giving up all disputed territories. For example, in the agreement he signed with Reich Rakhmonov, President of Tajikistan, Jiang gave away 27,000 square kilometers of disputed land near the Pamir region to Tajikistan, while China retained only 1,000 square kilometers. The story was not made public until the Tajik news agency reported this treaty.
Jiang Zemin, in his visit to the Philippines in 1996, offered to give up the disputed Spratly Islands, allowing for development by the Philippines.
In November 1996, Jiang Zemin visited India and signed “the agreement on strengthening mutual trust on military issues on the Sino-Indian borderline of militarily controlled region.” It set the tone for China and India to demarcate the controlled border line, which was to accept the McMahon Line and give up 90,000 square kilometers of fertile lands on the south side of Himalayas.
Section 5: China’s Procurement Diplomacy
Starting in the Jiang Zemin era, “Purchase Order Diplomacy,” also known as “Commercial Diplomacy” or “Procurement Diplomacy,” became a way for the communist regime to survive as other communist countries became impoverished due to communist control of the economy. Purchase Order Diplomacy has come to mean a favorable policy towards China by offering the target country large orders of goods. It can also refer to the establishment of ties with special interest groups in the target country, who leverage their influence to lobby the government so as to effect policies that are more favorable towards China.The Communists Offer Market Access
The ultimate goal of the communist regime is to perpetuate itself as its highest priority. In China, all policies are designed to serve this political purpose. Economic and foreign policies are also designed to justify the rule of the Chinese communists, which, for the sake of its own interests, will not hesitate to sacrifice the well-being of any other group. In contrast, the government in democratic countries exists to serve the public. In democracies, economic and cultural interests (for example, newspapers, schools, and religion) are not directly controlled by the political system and enjoy a large measure of freedom from state interference that is protected by the rule of law.Therefore, the Chinese communists’ economic and foreign policies serve the interests of a tiny few. The communist party government’s policies, including persecuting believers in God, encouraging inefficient state-owned enterprises, funding state propaganda, and engaging repressive surveillance, serve their own interests and not the Chinese people’s. So, the CCP’s operation of its government runs a huge moral deficit.
In the 1990s, after Jiang Zemin and the Chinese communists received capital infusions from the West, their rule was able to continue. With deeper and deeper pockets, the CCP gradually gained a key instrument when dealing with the West: the bargaining chip of capital and market access. The communist government’s foreign exchange policy gives it absolute control over capital, while the regime does not need to be responsible to the Chinese people’s interests. The CCP is thus able to make the best use of capital to take advantage of western capitalists and politicians. It lures other countries into trade. The countries that cannot hold onto their principles, and fail to recognize the Chinese communists’ moral corruption, fall into the CCP’s trap.
With Qualms, the West Accepts Trading with Communist China
In the 20 years between 1990 and 2010, the Chinese Communist Party placed significant numbers of purchase orders with western countries in three periods: from 1990 to 1994, from 1997 to 1999, and after 2004. If we look at the three periods in connection with the ups and downs in international relations, the motivation behind these purchasing orders become very obvious.After 1989, the U.S.-led western countries jointly imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on the Chinese communists to punish them for opening fire on students and other civilians in Tiananmen Square. High-level visits between China and western powers, as well as other multi-channel diplomatic exchanges, suddenly came to a standstill. “Purchase order diplomacy” effectively broke the standoff by appealing to the pragmatic side of the West and its economic interests.
In 1990, China purchased $9 billion worth of Boeing airplanes in one order. Every year, for five years after 1990, China sent at least one large purchasing delegation to the U.S. to purchase products so as to facilitate bilateral relations. Toward Europe, China sent two large delegations to make purchases in 1991 and 1992, totaling more than $1 billion each year. Money repaired relations with Europe. China resumed high-level official visits with Germany and France in 1992 and 1994, respectively. After 1992, western countries gradually removed the sanctions against China. “Purchase order diplomacy” played a decisive role.
The second period of intense purchasing orders was in the late 1990s. After the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995 and 1996 was past, China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations entered the final stage. The United States, as the most important negotiator, was the biggest obstacle to China being accepted into the WTO. The growing trade deficit with China was the focus of both the U.S. government and the American public. At this point, the primary goal of “purchase order diplomacy” was to appease the United States on trade issues and to reduce anxiety. China brought $4 billion of purchase orders to the United States every year for three years with the purpose of diluting the anti-China atmosphere and buying its way into the WTO.
CCP Exploits Its Buying Power to Great Advantage
After 10 years of practice, the Chinese Communist Party had mastered the art of purchase order diplomacy. The skillfulness is reflected in the control of the timing. China has been quite effective at increasing the diplomatic influence of the purchase order by extending the period of purchasing activities or prolonging the contracting process. In the earlier days, the purchase order diplomacy was usually a one-time deal that lasted less than a month. In later years, however, the CCP developed a more effective strategy by making the purchase process a longer negotiation, sending delegations in batches to place purchase orders. These orders were placed strategically before and after their key leader’s visits. Sometimes the activities last more than six months.For example, between November 2003 and January 2004, four purchasing delegations were sent to the United States. Orders covered airplanes, automobiles, soybeans, and telecommunication equipment. The overall period spanned over two months. On Nov. 18, 2003, the U.S. government suddenly made an announcement that it would set quota restrictions on imports of Chinese fabrics, bathrobes, and corsets. As the announcement was taking place right during the ongoing purchase activities from China, Beijing made a timely response by suspending one delegation that was to purchase soybeans from the United States. The suspension put a lot of pressure on the U.S. agricultural markets. A number of members of Congress from major soybean and wheat producing states, including Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle, pressured the Bush Administration and eventually effectuated concessions from the U.S. government. China restored the soybean purchasing delegation weeks afterwards.
The Chinese communist diplomatic skills in trade negotiations reached a new level with the extension of the time duration of the contracting process. Beijing would avoid committing a large deal, but instead start with the framework agreement or an agreement of intent, and finally inked the contract during the high-level visits. Airplane purchase orders were usually done this way. From the original intent to purchase to the final signing of the contract, there were three or four rounds of the official confirmation process, lasting two to three years. Each confirmation process would create a need for good diplomatic and political atmosphere from both sides, thus effectively extending the period in which the CCP controls the bilateral relationship. This way of negotiating showed a maturation of Chinese communist skills in getting the outcomes they wanted.
Section 6: Anti-Human Rights Diplomacy
Opposition to Universal Values
For hundreds of millions of Chinese people, communism is morally bankrupt, as evidenced by seven decades of lies and abusive government in mainland China. Although the banner of Marxism is the official ideology and basis for the Chinese communist rule, the real basis under Jiang Zemin was his fear of the universal values of democracy, freedom, and human rights—a fear that runs deep in his being. Still, a deeper threat that must be terrifying to him is his fear of a Supreme Being watching every misdeed he does and condemning him to hell.To expand his power base, Jiang cleverly used economic interests to weaken opposition, while at the same time, he promulgated a perverse version of the concept of human rights, discussed below, that he used as talking points for his demagoguery.
Following Jiang’s lead, the CCP took the human rights issue head on as a key task in responding to external forces. Human rights became an important theme of China’s foreign propaganda. On Nov. 1, 1991, China’s State Council Information Office published its first white paper: “China’s human rights situation,” claiming “Human Rights in the first place is people’s right to life,” and “The United States and other western countries’ concern over China’s human rights is a continuation of the U.S. hegemony and power politics, which endangers world peace and development. Using human rights [as an excuse] to interfere with other countries’ internal affairs and impose their power diplomacy hinder the practices of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
Since then, “China’s human rights situation” has become the CCP’s quintessential human rights publication with numerous revisions. It became the foundation for a variety of study materials. It all derives from Jiang’s perverse concept of human rights.
To push back against the section on the poor human rights record of China in the U.S. State Department’s annual human rights report, the CCP published its own annual report, titled, “The Human Rights Record of the United States.” The regime put together a team and collected materials published by western media and compiled a report released through the Information Office of the State Council, to “urge the United States to face up to its own human rights problems.”
Closed-Door Human Rights Dialogs
The CCP also developed a ploy on human rights issues, that is, human rights issues can only be discussed behind closed doors; otherwise, China says that it is “interfering in China’s internal affairs.” Jiang claimed, “Human rights is a problem within the sovereignty of a country. All countries have different views on human rights issues and should engage in dialogue instead of confrontation.” Jiang Zemin once said in front of Bill Clinton, “On issues such as human rights, it can only be discussed without interfering in other countries’ internal affairs.”Moreover, discussing with each country separately allows the CCP to weaken the international criticism. By isolating countries that have concerns over human rights, the CCP can be more successful in handling them one at a time. If the Chinese Communist Party is willing to talk one on one about its human rights problems, how could a western country find anything to object to? China also comes out ahead in that as long as a country is willing to sit down and talk, it recognizes the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, the ability of all countries to unite together to effectively standup to China’s human rights abuses is effectively blunted.
Negotiations and dialogues are really what the Chinese Communist Party is good at, especially when the deal is made behind closed doors. You can say anything and Chinese diplomats will promise everything, but nothing will be delivered. At the same time, since it’s done in a private setting and the public knows nothing about it, it’s easy to manipulate international opinion.
Beijing Beats Back Human Rights Criticism
Sometimes, the Chinese communists not only feed with “carrots,” but also wield a “big stick.” For certain more vulnerable countries, it would silence their criticism on the human rights issue by economic retaliation. For example, communist China leveraged trade relations and managed to get the support of some countries to kill the U.S.-led United Nations motion on human rights in China.In 1997, during the 53rd session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on April 15, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Denmark proposed a resolution condemning the human rights situation in China. Several major EU countries, including France, Germany, and Italy did not participate; neither did Japan, Canada, or Australia. Finally, the resolution was set aside as a “no-action motion,” which means the motion is rendered dead and nothing will come of it.
At the time, Denmark criticized China’s policy towards ethnic minorities and dissidents. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately countered: “I believe that the Danish government’s proposal of this anti-China resolution is shooting itself in the foot.” The official was saying your criticisms are self-defeating and will only bring pain to you. Indeed, the CCP made that pain happen by immediately canceling all commercial and trade contracts with the Scandinavian country.
In 2007, in retaliation for German Chancellor Angela Merkel meeting with the Dalai Lama, China canceled that year’s human rights dialogue with Germany.
In 2008 French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who also at the time held the EU presidency on a rotating basis, met with the Dalai Lama. China had warned the French government weeks before that it would impair Sino-France relations, but the French government would not be intimidated as to whom it can meet with. In protest, China canceled the 11th China-EU leaders’ meeting, which was originally scheduled to be held in France in early December. It was the first time in 11 years that the EU-China summit did not take place. In the end, trade was not impacted probably because the Chinese would be hurt too if they didn’t get to buy Airbus planes and from other French tech companies.
Over time as China’s power and economy grew, diplomatic conflicts of this kind between China and western countries dwindled, and eventually vanished. It was not because the CCP suddenly improved its human rights record, but because more and more western countries put their economic interests as their top priority ahead of human rights.
After a period of intensive investments in China since the late 1990s, many large western multinational companies developed a keen interest in expanding trade in the vast Chinese market, even though they knew it meant conducting business with a regime that had turned its guns and tanks on its unarmed citizens who sought democracy and an end to chronic corruption.
Section 7: The ‘China Model’
A Global Strategy
The Chinese communist regime does have a strategy. By taking advantage of the greed of the western world, it aims not only to have the regime survive and continue to rule 1.4 billion people, but to achieve something bigger, namely, to propagate the “China Model.”The talk about the China Model was once a hot topic. In the West, the term “China Model” is often used to reflect the Chinese way of economic growth. In China, however, government leaders and official scholars use it with a completely different implication.
In the scheme of things, the China Model contains the essential characteristics of the Chinese way of governance over the past 30 years under the Chinese Communist Party’s rule, and the strategic plan for China’s global expansion.
The China Model serves two purposes.
In the center of China Model is the Communist Party, which assumes paramount leadership and absolute control over every aspect of political, economic, and social life. It completely denies the multi-party system or parliamentary politics; neither does it implement separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government. Marxism is always the leading ideology for the whole nation.
Economically, the China Model refuses full privatization but instead implements a mixed ownership structure dominated by the state. Although certain elements of market economy are introduced, the scope and strength of government intervention dwarfs that of western countries. The state has full control over land, for which the private sector has a limited right of usage. Large-scale state-owned enterprises overshadow key sectors of the economy, such as banking, energy, communications, transportation, and manufacturing. As in free countries, a competitive labor market is present in China as well as a limited capital market. China and the West follow two different paths: in the former, the state drives the flow of capital, while in the latter, the state generally stays out of the way, and capital flows where it is perceived by investors and bankers to reap the most benefit.
Lenin’s Plan: Use Capitalism to Finally Defeat Capitalism
The China Model as espoused by the CCP is not a new invention. A lot of its ideas could have been taken from Vladimir Lenin, the founder of communist revolutionary Soviet Russia.“On the one hand, Lenin emphasized the need to overcome the ‘socialist emotions,’ and to face reality and be pragmatic. He proposed to transition from state capitalism to an economy where the state modulates the market transactions and currency circulation, where private capitalism is allowed to have a certain degree of development, and nonessential and poorly performing state-owned enterprises are leased to domestic and foreign capitalists. Such an economy would encourage domestic and foreign private investment in Russia, hire experts and business management with high pay, use free trade and market competition to attract capital and technologies at a low cost.”
Quoting again from the article: “On the other hand, Lenin stressed that utilizing capitalism is both a policy and a strategy. It’s necessary that the state controls the wholesale business, the state puts resources together to effectively manage the nation’s economic lifeblood: state-owned enterprises, and the state always has a tight grip on the power of regulating and tuning various economic relations. It’s forbidden to violate the employees’ legal rights and forbidden to hire child labor. Lenin also emphasized that throughout the process of utilizing capitalism, it was always an issue of who defeats whom. He mandated that Communist Party members and the working class combat ‘the invasion of bourgeois ideology and a return of the bourgeois world view.’ They ought to overcome self-pride and arrogant emotions and humbly learn advanced management expertise and technologies from the capitalists …”
This conflict between capitalist and socialist economies need never become kinetic. Lenin addressed how to be victorious in this bloodless war, using Marxist principles and advocating policies for the economy, politics, education, and diplomacy. He talked about the Communist Party, cadres and the working class, combatting hostile forces at home and abroad, and laying the foundation for the Soviet Union. What he wrote has implications for today’s China.
From the above quotes, one can easily see that Lenin’s ideas were actually implemented in Chinese communism’s so-called “reform and opening up,” beginning in the 1980s. China’s choice of state capitalism has a clear goal of eventually defeating capitalism. This is very different from some western policy makers’ wishful thinking that the growth Chinese economy would eventually lead to a democratic and free society. Jiang Zemin was clearly aware of this.
