Opinion

Missing the Big Picture, US Policy on North Korea Could Bring Disaster

So far in 2016, North Korea has tested an atomic weapon and long-range missile. The U.N. Security Council responded with sanctions amid hope that China might contain a belligerent ally. The world expects the U.S. to monitor international developments, and those not posing immediate danger or causing global media alarm are often put to the side with a cursory response. “Yet these important but not necessarily urgent problems contain the seeds of a potentially larger disaster and can grow into a deadly menace that is ultimately impossible to ignore,” explains Paul Bracken, author and Yale professor of political science and management. “One danger of being the sole superpower is getting overwhelmed by immediate, urgent issues while other important issues are repeatedly kicked down the road.“ Bracken describes a game theory strategy by which a player distracts a strong opponent with multiple pressure points. The U.S. errs by treating aggression, whether in the South China Sea or from North Korea, as isolated incidents rather than “connecting individual strategies across the fronts creates an altogether more effective approach.”
Missing the Big Picture, US Policy on North Korea Could Bring Disaster
The U.N. Security Council votes during a meeting on sanctions against North Korea at the United Nations in New York on March 2, 2016. Don Emmert/AFP/Getty Images
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NEW HAVEN—Watching North Korea again test an atomic bomb and long-range missile within four weeks of each other is like a repeat visit to a movie. The U.N. Security Council slaps enhanced sanctions on Pyongyang, actions that won’t be implemented or observed, much like New Year’s resolutions. China’s disapproval is spun as a new “turning point” by the United States, supposedly because Beijing has finally lost patience with its ally.

The real intent of these moves is to get the North Korean tests out of the media spotlight—thereby removing pressure to come to grips with what is developing in Northeast Asia.

Yet it would be a mistake to think that a “same old, same old” policy is playing out again. In my book on “The Second Nuclear Age,” I emphasized the need for distinguishing between urgent problems, and those that were important but not necessarily urgent. Seen this way, the Middle East and ISIS are urgent challenges. They are immediate, play into the news cycle, and frankly, are what the vast majority of U.S. attention focuses on.

Then there are important issues that are less urgent. North Korea could go on for a long time before something dire happens. The likelihood of an attack on South Korea or Japan appears no greater today than it did one year ago, or five years ago. We could be wrong, but it is reasonable to judge that while North Korea’s nuclear missile buildup isn’t good, it also isn’t urgent. Most likely the problem will be passed on to the next administration, or kicked down the road beyond that.

Less urgent problems can contain seeds of large disasters. A North Korean nuclear ICBM could hit South Korea or Japan.