History First
The venerable “Warthog” is viewed by some as a Cold War relic that only exists as a jobs program for congressional representatives. This is myopic.
I spent a 24-year career as a Marine infantry officer, later transitioning to Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), commanding at the Team, Platoon, and Company levels in both Joint and Combined combat environments.
On Sept. 26, 2007, my platoon was on the receiving end of a complex ambush against an entrenched enemy. We fought our way out, often engaging enemy fighters inside of 100 meters and sometimes at hand-grenade range. In a difficult and violent action, we broke the back of the enemy’s assault.
We used two A-10Cs to destroy the enemy element isolated in a trench line. The A-10C’s impressive firepower and danger-close delivery of bombs facilitated the extrication of my 35-member assault force, without a single U.S. casualty. This simply would not have been possible without the A-10C working in close consonance with my Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC); a trained air support employment specialist.
I’m a living testament to the A-10C’s utility.
The Issue
In its 2023 budget, the Air Force revealed a 5-year plan to eliminate its A-10C CAS aircraft without an adequate replacement and to cut Terminal Air Control Party Specialist/Joint Terminal Attack Controller (TACP/ JTAC) manning by 50 percent.
Problem Framing
The U.S. is terrible at predicting the next battlespace and future wars. Having a robust quiver of options is better than eliminating a proven platform like the A-10C. Paradoxically, if the USAF follows its own doctrine to justify getting rid of the A-10C, this only bolsters the case for keeping it.
No aircraft engages the enemy alone. Much like ground forces use “combined arms” (tanks, artillery, infantry, and aviation) to prevail on land, the Air Force uses “Force Packaging” to win in the air. The four major threats to aircraft over a modern battlefield are:
- Air (enemy fighters);
- Radar-guided Surface-Air Missiles (SAMs)
- Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and;
- Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
The Air Force spends a lot of taxpayer dollars to ensure its fighter team (F-16; F-15EX; F-22; and F-35) can kill or negate enemy aircraft and radar SAMs, but the sensitive skins, engines, and reduced capacity for flares make these aircraft extremely vulnerable to ADA and MANPADS. In contrast, the A-10C is by far the most survivable aircraft against ADA and MANPADS threats found directly above the battlefield and is the only CAS platform specifically designed to protect ground forces in battle.
In a firefight, I sought to dominate high ground, known as “key terrain,” to achieve tactical superiority. The airspace directly overhead the battlefield is the ultimate key terrain. An American ground commander fighting against a capable and determined adversary needs an aircraft with a massive amount of firepower and eyes on both friendly troops and the enemy. Without the A10C’s capability, the USAF cedes the most important position on the battlefield, where CAS is a powerful surgical tool. I can’t imagine fighting without A-10Cs, which provided me a critical advantage in a dynamic, highly-contested combat environment.
Further, the A-10C was designed to operate from expeditionary airstrips. This works to the A-10C’s advantage in peer conflicts. Advanced fighter aircraft require concrete or asphalt surfaces of at least 8,000 feet in length. Countries like China will use any weapon they can, like ballistic and cruise missiles, to negate aircraft carriers and airfields capable of supporting fighters. Alternatively, the A-10C can island hop around the Pacific with a small support package and operate from 5,000 to 6,000 feet of dirt, grass, or even a short stretch of highway.
The A-10C thrives using a combination of force packaging and intelligent tactics, as evidenced in the 2016 deployment of the A-10C to support U.S. forces in Syria. Although Air Force leadership and beltway pundits would prefer Congress forget about the A-10C operating within multiple surface-to-air missile engagement zones and merging with Russian fighters during Operation Inherent Resolve, the A-10C proved itself on the modern battlefield.
Dollars and Sense
Head-to-Head
Money aside, the Key West Agreement of 1948 charged the USAF to provide Close Air Support to the U.S. Army. The A-10Cs real benefit combines specialists (pilots) with a purpose-built airplane, and the funds used to field the A-10C were pulled from the Army’s own Close Air Support programs. Divesting the only CAS-designed aircraft in the USAF without a replacement is akin to dereliction of duty.
After the fly-off, the A-10C bested the F-35 in CAS, Airborne Forward Air Control, and Combat Search and Rescue mission performance—both in low-threat and high-threat environments. An F-35 pilot was quoted as saying “I need F-35s on the leading edge to detect systems and provide a screen against advanced enemy fighters. I need Warthogs in-depth with the magazine firepower to smite our enemies from the face of the earth.” As a former Ground Force Commander (GFC), I agree. There are two salient reasons for this:
The A-10C has integrated modern technology. First, with four radios and four data-link options that talk to ground troops, its communications package is more compatible with ground maneuver elements than any other fighter.
Second, although some A-10Cs are equipped with the newest jam-resistant GPS, its direct-fire weapons and its pilots’ eyes-on tactics negate the effects of GPS jamming. In GPS-denied environments where communications will be severely degraded, other fighters will struggle to accurately deliver GPS-dependent weapons. This is crucial for a GFC in a close fight, where seconds feel like hours.
The A-10C also provides an asymmetric advantage, by providing CAS from 75 feet above ground level, up to 35,000 feet MSL (Mean Sea Level). With moderate speeds and an extremely tight turning radius, which reduces re-attack timelines, the A-10C is responsive, can remain close to friendly forces for long periods of time, and has flexible, forward-firing weapons. These weapons provide more options to quickly engage targets. No other aircraft provides effective CAS in the low-altitude arena, which the war in Ukraine has shown to be one of the few places CAS can be employed in contested airspace.
Unlike the F-35, which requires a prepared airfield to support GFCs from altitudes miles above the battlespace, the A-10C pilot can remain eyes-on friendly forces; enemy forces; utilize targeting pods to generate coordinates for artillery missions; and dominate an adversary in close proximity from tree-top level using 30-mm armor-piercing incendiary rounds, or from 30,000 feet and dozens of miles away using small-diameter bombs.
Humans Before Hardware
There is also a looming 50 percent reduction of air-ground combat integration specialists. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) represents the largest proportion of Joint Terminal Attack Control qualified personnel in the USAF. They are experts in Joint Fires integration and the employment of surface and air-based fires essential to successful large-scale combat operations, and work directly with GFCs to employ air power. For the U.S. Army, this reduction will eliminate TACP support below the brigade level in a large conflict. These mission-focused teams of CAS professionals habitually train with A-10C pilots to ensure the safe, proper, and expeditious employment of CAS.
I worked closely with these impressive airmen during my time in Special Operations, where we have a saying that “humans are more important than hardware.” In this case, it proves particularly true, and hobbling the USAF’s TACP manning defies logic, since it directly affects the Army’s ability to fight our enemies, particularly peer adversaries.
Ground combat is difficult, and at times confusing. As a GFC and qualified JTAC, I could control my own air support in combat. My background and training provided a distinct advantage. I understood ground force fire and maneuver, and I could utilize air support assets to maximize my Marines’ abilities to succeed. However, as a JTAC-qualified GFC, I was the exception; trying to manage CAS while maintaining control of my unit was not optimal.
Having CAS-trained professionals in the air above me and a TACP next to me on the ground is the ideal partnership. A TACP at my side, focused on using air to achieve my intent for CAS, significantly improved my unit’s effectiveness. This is especially important in dynamic, asymmetric environments where high-altitude aircraft dropping bombs on coordinates without eyes on the battlefield will be worthless at best, and cause fratricide or civilian casualties at worst.
The True Cost
One of the SOF truths is “competent [forces] cannot be created after the emergency occurs.” Getting rid of the A-10C; its qualified CAS-trained pilots; and the air-ground integration expert TACPs is a recipe for disaster.
Vietnam demonstrated that America doesn’t like to wage wars with overwhelming pain to its people. I don’t know what future war holds, but I do know that the largest risk is assumed by ground forces, who will go to war without adequate platforms and the flexible engagement options required to fight effectively. That Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) are ignoring this is a mistake of epic proportions.
