The 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will convene on October 15. Widespread reports from outside China concur that even before it starts, the agenda will showcase political reform. This conclusion is based on media speculation fuelled by the CCP's deceptive tactics. Of late, the CCP has continued to project the illusion of a liberal political atmosphere. It has fostered some rumors, such as support for the competitively fair election of congressional committee members, and political reforms to be promoted by Hu Jintao. The brand of 'freedom of speech' used in some democratic magazines will be tolerated. The ban on 'breaking events reporting' will be lifted. Such rumors create anticipation among outsiders of democratic reform. How do we view such possibilities? I think that without major systematic adjustments and outright policy declarations, we need to be cautious and vigilant about the prospects for political reform.
First, the Hu-Wen (Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao) administration may want to initiate some changes. This does not mean that Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao possess a belief in democracy, or that they have a heartfelt desire to democratize the country. From a subjective point of view, we cannot place any hope in the Hu-Wen administration. Consolidating their own power is surely the most important issue for them. Jiang Zemin's recent high-profile activities, along with the struggle to oust the Shanghai Party chief, show that Hu hasn't consolidated his own power yet. At the same time, social climate and economic development issues have made the Hu-Wen alliance aware of their vulnerability. If Hu wants to eliminate Jiang's influence, but keep crisis at bay during his watch, it is wise for him to ask for civil support. Thus, creating a liberal image politically or making some breakthroughs are feasible.
But we have to consider another possibility—the rumor of political reform is actually a deceptive ploy. What the Hu-Wen administration obviously cares the most about is successfully hosting the 2008 Olympic games during their administration. No doubt, it will also be their biggest challenge. Upon the conclusion of a successful Olympic games, Hu-Wen can claim to have achieved a political gambit and smooth transition. If the Olympic games were to become problematic however, they could not step down from the political stage with heads held high. Both Hu and Wen are not pioneering or innovative leaders. They tend to abide by time-worn rules. Pragmatically, they clearly comprehend that democratic groups and western countries regard the Olympic games as their best opportunity to get democracy into China. The call for democracy before the Olympic games cannot be easily suppressed through the national propaganda machinery. Thus, prior to the Olympic games the CCP could circulate rumors of the government promoting political reform. This, in turn, can stabilize the pro-democracy groups, that then exercise self-restraint in anticipation of CCP cooperation. Once the Olympic games are over, the CCP can renege on its promises. By that time, outsiders would have no leverage and little recourse to make the CCP comply.
The first option is a contrived and deceptive drama—performed in a realistic way; the other is total deception. Let's see which way the CCP will choose to act.
The author, Wang Dan, was a student leader during the Tiananmen Square Student Democracy Movement in 1989.
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