Trillanes was the apparent leader of the young soldiers who strung explosives around a shopping mall and proclaimed themselves seekers of reform and redemption, the latest in a long line of abortive coup attempts going back to 1987. Whatever happens to Trillanes now that he is in custody as the public face of mutiny, we at least know what was bothering him. Trillanes had quite literally done his homework.

As a graduate student at the prestigious University of the Philippines in 2001-02, Trillanes was the author of two studies looking at corruption in the navy. In his two-part study, Trillanes outlined a system of corruption that extended from low-level bribe-taking to assist arms smugglers in the rebellious provinces of Mindanao to the procurement of equipment at naval headquarters.

"The direct effects of corruption in the navy on national development are staggering," Trillanes wrote in the first installment of his study, done in October 2001. "It affects the economy through the systemic rape of the funds entrusted to it. These include losses from the ghost payroll, ghost repairs, ghost deliveries, pilferage of fuel, overpriced purchases, etc."

According to his academic work, in the contentious waters of Mindanao, navy patrols routinely accept bribes either to protect smugglers, pirates and rebels or to look the other way, allowing contraband goods to reach shore and rebels to move unimpeded by naval forces. According to Trillanes, naval corruption has played a material role in the ability of rebels from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf to continue operations against government forces.

"The big-time smugglers, pirates and bandits (including the Abu Sayyaf) will never venture out into the Philippine waters unless they are given 'clearance' by the navy," Trillanes wrote. "They would not risk losing their valuable merchandise, which include arms, explosives, drugs and other contrabands, to a crusading navy captain patrolling the high seas."

The Philippine Navy, chronically short of equipment and modern ships, has long complained that it can barely do its job because it does not have the resources to upgrade its fleet. Trillanes doubts that the excuses hold water. "Through the years, the navy top brass have always raised the issues of obsolescence and shortage of operating assets of the fleet to cover for the navy's ineffectiveness. But is this really the case? Or is it simply caused by an institutionalized corruption that exists in all levels and in all areas of the organization?" The answer, the rebel officer clearly believes, is to be found in the ranks of corrupt senior commanders and their underlings.

Trillanes, a 1995 honors graduate of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), is the son of a military officer and is married to an army captain, a 1997 PMA graduate. He sits firmly in a tradition of idealistic officers who have come to see themselves as guardians of the nation, especially since the successful 1986 military-backed revolt that toppled the dictator Ferdinand Marcos. To those who may have read his thesis before the Sunday mutiny, his anger would have come as no surprise - nor would the fact that he eventually directed his wrath against the national leadership.

At the conclusion of his first study, Trillanes recounts an incident in February 2001 in which a well-regarded chief of the Philippine Navy openly criticized corrupt procurement practices in the Philippine Marines. The marines demanded that Rear Admiral Guillermo Wong be relieved of command for his remarks, and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo left then-armed forces chief General Angelo Reyes to resolve the crisis. Wong, rather than accept a demotion to another position offered by Reyes, resigned his command in a move that was accepted by Arroyo but widely seen as a blow to military reformers.

Reyes is now defense secretary, and chief among the rebel demands during the mutiny was his resignation from office.

"For a president and commander-in-chief whose government was supposed to be founded on such slogans as 'New Politics', moral regeneration and good governance, to say that what General Reyes did was the right thing was truly demoralizing to say the least," Trillanes wrote in his study. "This was the first indication of the type of leadership the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] would expect from its commander-in-chief."

Observers of the Philippine military say that Trillanes' complaints are nothing new but that his studies on corruption hold up to close examination. "His scholarship and methodology are sound," said Sheila Coronel, the executive director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Her center has published similar studies on corruption in the military and other branches of government.

The second installment of Trillanes' thesis, written in March 2002, is a study of procurement processes and is based on a random sample of 30 civilian contractors doing business with the navy. It is every bit as damning as his first effort. Trillanes found evidence of corruption in virtually every office involved in procurement. His respondents said they most often paid bribes in order to "expedite the processing of papers".

Sadly, the most corrupt office, according to Trillanes, is the naval branch of the Commission on Audit (COA), a government watchdog agency that is supposed to guard against corruption. One hundred percent of Trillanes' respondents cited corruption in the COA.

As a result of his study, published reports indicate that Trillanes began contacting other members of his PMA graduating class to air grievances and seek solutions. When the rebels eventually acted - the government says with the assistance of opposition politicians - they called themselves "Magdalo", taking the name of the first ship in the Philippine Navy when the infant republic battled Spain before the United States invaded the islands in 1898.

Word of disgruntlement in the lower ranks reached the ear of the president and, on July 13, Trillanes was given a meeting with Arroyo in the presidential palace. He gave her a copy of his study and detailed his complaints against the military command, Arroyo told reporters on Thursday.

Based on his writing if not his actions, Trillanes comes across as sincere, idealistic and deeply worried about his institution. The charges in his study are nothing new in the Philippines, of course. Observers of the military and other government institutions frequently comment on the depth of official malfeasance at most levels of government.

But does this justify trying to overthrow the government? There is serious corruption in the Department of Education, said Coronel, citing a study done by her center in 1999, "but we didn't see teachers holding students hostage to protest unpaid salaries and undelivered books and chairs".

For now the failed rebellion leaves behind nagging questions for the Philippines. If corruption is as deeply entrenched as Trillanes and his allies say, why has the government failed to act? To what extent does corruption undermine the efforts of the Philippines - a key US ally in the war on terror - to battle rebels in Mindanao and elsewhere? Does the dissatisfaction of a small group of elite young officers herald the beginning of a new round of destabilizing coup rumors and attempts?

The mini-mutiny inspired by Trillanes' academic output may be something of a wake-up call for Arroyo and her commanders. If the officers have a point, and the evidence certainly suggests they do, then the government is going to have to clean house or face the consequences.