.png)
A protester shouts slogans during a demonstration against the military rulers of the country on Feb. 10 in Cairo, Egypt. The poor economic condition of the country and the unrest are a threat to the transition to a democracy. (Carsten Koall/Getty Images)
Egypt’s new Parliament is taking seat amid ongoing protests on the streets, deteriorating relations with the United States over an impending trial of NGO workers, and threats that the United States might review $1.3 billion in Egyptian military aid. Thus, it’s essential to read into the economic policy the Muslim Brotherhood will devise to redress an economy battered by a year of severe mismanagement by the ruling military junta and its successive transitional governments.
The Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, or FJP, won 47 percent of the seats in the Egyptian Parliament in January 2012, and concerns about that accession to power largely concentrate on secondary issues—sartorial restrictions, alcohol prohibition, gender-segregated beaches—leaving little room for serious policy discussion. At times concerns were raised about the Brotherhood’s perspective on Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.
For the first time in its modern history, Egypt has been placed under the tutelage of an Islamist party. And more than cultural attitudes, its economic policies may signify the most profound changes for the country.
Within the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP, competing ideologies wrestle over economic planning.
For much of its 85 years of existence, the Muslim Brotherhood was a banned opposition party. As such, it didn’t have to develop consistent economic policy. FJP’s economic policy today is a confusing series of ideas, mostly aimed at its conservative constituency. Short of a complete economic plan, FJP works from a series of clippings.
Trying to discern a pattern from those clippings, one is struck by two competing ideologies wrestling within the economic policy making:
One is an interventionist tendency reflecting the organization’s traditional hierarchical structure. For example, Abdel Hafez El Sawy, now leading the FJP’s Economic Council, criticizes Egypt’s “unproductive and rentier economy” while emphasizing the need to encourage productivity by selecting prime sectors.
The other is a group of Islamist industry and trade leaders headed by Khairat Al-Shater, multimillionaire businessman who found himself imprisoned by the Mubarak regime, assets twice confiscated. He is now a FJP strategist and senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Shater and others, such as his partner Hassan Malek or Safwan Sabet of household brand Juhaina fame, would argue for a liberal, market economy with a business-friendly climate.
Popular Policies
Al-Shater is already tasked with leading the massive Renaissance Project for FJP, a long-term plan to fix the economy, public administration, health, and education. The project, awarded a generous budget, is at the heart of FJP’s strategy.
Alongside such laudable generalities as restoring trust in the economy and self-sufficiency in strategic goods, FJP advocates for a mixed-basket of policies that include an export substitution industrial policy in cooperation with the private sector; controlling budget deficits and public debt, while rationing public spending; increasing the minimum wage, an original demand of Tahrir Square protesters; strengthening competition and anti-trust legislation; introducing a progressive income tax; and raising the ceiling for tax exemptions.
The interventionist and free-market tendencies explain why commercial banks and the stock market won’t see their business threatened. Despite declarations of “moving to an Islamic economy”—one where interest-free Islamic finance replaces conventional commercial banking—embedded in the party platform, the Brotherhood and its businesspeople know that Islamic banking accounts for less than 4 percent of the local banking industry, estimated at $193 billion. They don’t want to frighten depositors and borrowers. The government will likely encourage banks to offer Islamic financial products to clients.
Most striking about FJP’s top-down approach in a nation where 25.2 percent of the population lives below the poverty line is the perception of poverty alleviation as a form of charity, not a necessary outcome of economic growth. This is a remnant of the Brotherhood’s past far-reaching organized charity work. The source of their grass-roots support is a historical perception of how development is “done,” as per the electoral program, with “permanent and continuous financing” through charity. Tellingly, the poverty-alleviation section of the electoral program is under social justice, not economic development.
So how will government finance charities and balance the national budget? Here, the FJP fumbles, offering little about fiscal policy in its electoral program. The FJP seems to plan on methodically going through all of the country’s pockets.
One potentially deep pocket is several billion in government “special funds”—slush funds not supervised by the government or included in the state budget. Another would be to cut energy subsidies for industry, a $3.3 billion reduction—both ideas of the previous transitional government.
The FJP also estimates that “reviewing all oil and gas export deals” could provide $18 billion to state coffers—a wildly hypothetical estimate, as it assumes trade partners, most notably Israel, will agree on changing terms of agreements.
Some Brotherhood leaders have floated the idea of repossessing previously state-owned land from owners who obtained it through corruption—a fair demand, but complicated, considering the reaction of investors to limited repossessions conducted by the transitional government in 2011.
Another improbable source of income, hinted at by FJP, is making zakat— yearly alms that Muslims should pay to help the less fortunate, amounting to 2.5 percent of wealth—compulsory not voluntary.
The Brotherhood, increasingly engaged in visible politicking with the army, is unlikely to touch the deep pocket of the military budget any time soon. With the help of U.S. largess, $1.3 billion per year—in effect, unlikely to be revised downward—the military’s massive economic interests range from production of ovens and mineral water to beach-condo rentals. Such budget details are not public, though it’s estimated that the army’s economic interests represent a staggering 30 percent of the Egyptian GDP.
