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An image grab taken from a video uploaded on YouTube on Jan. 29 shows armed men, said to be members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), standing guard in a street in the central Syrian town of Rastan in the Homs province. (/AFP/Getty Images)
Top officials in the Syrian government strongly suggested to me more than a decade ago that when Syria’s President Bashar Assad first assumed power he was determined to introduce some significant political reforms. Why, then, has he failed to implement at least some of what he had intended to do and failed to meet the public’s expectations for change following his father’s 30-year reign?
Mr. Assad was able to assert his rule based only on the tacit condition that he would preserve the status-quo.
Mr. Assad inherited from his father more than merely the office of the Presidency. He inherited a system of governing: an entrenched ruling apparatus consisting of the Baath party leadership, the high military brass, a massive Intelligence (Mukhabarat) community, internal security, and top business elites; all dominated by Bashar’s own Alawite minority group, which had heavily-vested interests in maintaining the system at all costs. Mr. Assad was able to assert his rule based only on the tacit condition that he would preserve the status-quo, which in the end has turned out to be his albatross.
At the onset of the upheaval in Syria nearly ten months ago, Mr. Assad was again inclined to make some concessions to pacify the people but was immediately overruled by the same clique of powerful individuals that surround him today, including his powerful brother, Maher, the commander of the Republican Guard.
An offer to negotiate a safe exit and immunity from prosecution should be placed on the table.
The same inter-play is currently taking place as elements of the ruling apparatus have tied their fates together with the knowledge that meaningful reforms would inevitably usurp many of their powers, which they are unwilling to relinquish, regardless of the public’s suffering. For this reason, any practical solution to Syria’s crisis must take into account the nature of its intra-group relations and the choices that can be made within such relations.
Arab League Fails
The failure of the Arab League (AL) observers’ mission was predictable as they did not have the mandate or the ability to move freely anywhere and anytime within the country, being instead directed by the Syrian authorities to visit and report about places and incidents of the government’s own choice.
Since the observers’ mission began a month ago, government forces have killed more than five hundred Syrians. Following the extension of the mission by an additional month only a few days ago, the Arab league decided to suspend the observers’ mission, as the indiscriminate killing of civilians continued.
Neither the continuation of such a mission (which was already thwarted after all of the Gulf states’ observers quit in Syria) nor the call by the AL for Assad to step down and for new assembly elections within two months to draft a new constitution would bring about any serious change.
The AL decision to turn to the UN with the support of the United States and the EU at the time of this writing may produce a watered down resolution at best that will neither call for Assad to step down nor impose any meaningful sanctions. Russia has already made it abundantly clear that it will veto any such resolution.
Considering the fact that whatever happens in Syria will have serious regional repercussions, any outside interference will have to be carefully weighed against the internal conditions and how they are evolving. One thing, however, remains clear: significant and permanent changes will not occur in Syria through any kind of give and take with the current government as the problem is not Assad himself as much as the clique surrounding him, which will remain even if he steps down.
Squeezing Out Assad
In this regard, the AL, with the support of other major players including Turkey, should develop a strategy that will squeeze out Assad and his cohorts even though this may still take the better part of 2012. The strategy should consist of four distinct yet interconnected components, which should be pursued simultaneously.
First, fearing that he may meet Qaddafi’s fate and concerned that he may never regain the legitimacy needed to lead, an offer to negotiate a safe exit and immunity from prosecution for himself, family, Alawite leaders, and several dozens of his lieutenants should be placed on the table.
This is particularly urgent as it would need to occur before Assad and his clique are indicted by the International Criminal Court, which can happen as soon as charges of en-mass killing are brought against them. Once Assad is indicted, he will be discouraged from opting for this course.
For this reason, instead of asking Assad to hand over power to one deputy (a plan already rejected and dubbed a “plot” by Syria’s Foreign Minister, Walid al-Muallem), the AL, in consultation with the Obama Administration and Turkey, should fully and aggressively explore the “safe exit” option where Assad is offered a safe haven, sparing his country from racing further toward the abyss.
