The current demonization of Ahmadinejad fails to place the current situation in the proper historical context. Under the Shah, when my father was in elementary school, government soldiers came into his class one day requiring that every child join the Shah’s political party. Every child did this, save one. A soldier took him away and 30 minutes later, he came back to the classroom and joined the party.
A family member of mine, Gholam-Reza Nikpay, Tehran’s mayor under the Shah, was executed after Ayatollah Khomeini took power simply because he was affiliated with the Shah’s regime. These are two examples of Iranian authoritarianism that are unparalleled today.
While it’s difficult for opposition leaders Mir-Hossein Mussavi and Mehdi Karroubi to vocalize their ideas, the fact that they are given some avenue to organize and protest the regime represents a stark contrast to pre-revolutionary Iran.
The opposition movement has scored impressive victories despite the odds and political repression of the current regime. As a result of the post-election protests and domestic strife, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s regime has moved cautiously away from the right and towards the center, in particular over its nuclear, foreign, and economic policy.
The Nuclear Paradigm
On Sept. 25, 2009, Iran revealed to the IAEA that it has a second nuclear facility under construction near Qom. This announcement, coupled with Iran’s test firing of long-range missiles, sent shockwaves throughout the international community. The new facility will be equipped with more advanced technology than their existing facility at Natanz, allowing Iran to enrich uranium at a much higher rate and potentially enabling Iran to produce weapons-grade uranium.
Iran has stated and IAEA reports have confirmed that there has been no evidence of a move towards constructing a nuclear weapon. Iran is still adamant in its desire to pursue a nuclear program; Ahmadinejad, however, is more open than ever to compromise and make concessions. Iran has returned to the table to discuss its nuclear policy with the 5+1 group, in which it outlines its nuclear proposal and nuclear ambitions. Furthermore, Iran allowed the IAEA to inspect its new facility on Oct. 25.
Iran is a highly influential regional actor, and how it pursues its nuclear ambitions will have an impact on the entire Middle East.
Iran’s persistence on pursuing a nuclear program must be understood as a political ploy. Its current nuclear policy has two goals: enhancing its authority as a regional power and fulfilling a desire to be a part of the “nuclear club.” Iran’s nuclear insistence is as much a product of its own glorified ambitions of becoming a dominant nation as it is the West’s treatment of it as a pariah state.
A new policy that gives Iran a chance to be a part of strategic discussions on regional affairs and increased dialogue between Iran and the West would serve to ease tensions and facilitate regional cooperation. While the outcomes of these nuclear talks are yet to be determined, initial signs are positive.
A More Sober Approach: Economic Rapprochement
In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s focal campaign promises were a redistribution of oil revenues to the people and restoring Iran to a plateau of prestige in the Middle East. On the first promise, millions of dissatisfied Iranians as well as economists such as Djavad Salehi-Isfahani deemed his first term a failure. Indeed, opposition-movement candidates Mir-Hossein Mussavi and Mehdi Karroubi based their campaigns on reforming the economy.
Mindful of this opposition, Ahmadinejad is now focusing on repairing the damaged economy. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani conducted a study on the economic potential of Iran in “Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics” and determined that the country has many opportunities for massive economic growth, propelled by a growing and increasingly educated labor force.
Recently Iran has introduced some measures of privatization by allowing foreign banks to open branches in Iran. Measures such as a joint oil-refining venture with Iraq, opening up to Swiss investors, and increasing its trade with Asian countries have been carefully planned to lessen Iran’s reliance on oil, boost a struggling economy, and circumvent UN and U.S. sanctions.
Increased privatization serves as a sign that the government seems willing to give up some measure of control to appease the opposition movement and dissident population. To what extent Iran is willing to give up control over the economy, however, is still unknown.
Ahmadinejad’s first term was characterized by strong anti-Western, anti-Israeli sentiments and tensions rose to dangerously high levels, with Israel often threatening to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities and Bush deliberating war with Iran. But since the June 2009 elections, Iran has toned down its rhetoric and developed a more sober approach to its foreign policy.
A recent letter by opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mussavi stressed the continuation of the movement through respectful means. In addition, former President Mohammad Khatami and Mir-Hossein met last week to discuss the domestic crisis in Iran, warning that the regime should “not create a situation where the forces that are against the principles of the Revolution and the system become active.” This warning has been heeded by the government and it is a success of the opposition movement that it has influenced Iran’s recent progress.
The root of the opposition has taken a more behind-the-scenes approach. Mussavi quietly challenges the legitimacy of the regime while pushing for moderation. And there are two pieces of good news for the opposition’s future prospects: The age and health of Ali Khamenei suggest he will not remain in power for much longer, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cannot run for re-election in 2013.
Until then, the opposition movement must weather the storm and should continue working to force Ahmadinejad and his hard-line supporters to leave the right and reach a middle ground, eventually leading to increased stability. Failure to do so could lead to catastrophic consequences for Iran, ranging from revolution to regional war.
Duran Parsi is an intern for the Foreign Policy In Focus project at the Institute for Policy Studies. Foreign Policy In Focus, www.fpif.org.
