The Waziris who dwell in Pakistan’s northwest are traditionalists in the true sense of the word: they believe in male dominance over the clan and guard women aggressively from contact with the outside world.
To the detriment of the Pakistan government, they are also heavily armed and exceedingly warlike.
Long left to its own devices on the Afghan border, Waziristan has become a safe haven for terrorists, including Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the lesser-known Hezb-Islami Gulbuddin.
The Pakistani government, armed with U.S. weapons and under the prodding of world leaders, is now seeking to root out the terrorists in its Wazaristani midst, an attempt that has never been successful in the past.
Pakistan Goes on the Offensive
The Pakistani military has prepared a ground offensive into the Waziristan area, which has been widely reported. Watching the preparations and ongoing battle, the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan have had many questions in their minds.
Above all are issues like: "Why did it take the Pakistani army four months to intervene in a conflict in the notoriously unstable South-Waziristan tribal region. What is behind this hesitation and what can security forces expect now?"
We recall that the ground forces’ first directive to attack was not given until June. Since then, troops gathered along the border between Pakistan and Waziristan.
The four-month delay was a gift to the rebels after the setbacks they had encountered during the summer in the Makaland-region, and it gave them time to regroup. Moreover, they were successful in enlisting sympathizers, and were eventually able to target government troops. Hundreds were killed on both sides during that time; former Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was reported killed by a US-drone strike.
His suspected death led to the belief that this would be the best time for a sweeping operation in the area, and that smaller, locally centered actions would do away with any further threats.
Rumors were that the search for a successor led to internal strife, and military action against the groups should commence immediately. Alas, the army was unwilling to announce a specific date for an attack on South Waziristan, even though officials had decided that then was the best time.
South Waziristan is an arid region, bare of forests and with scant water sources. It is also sparsely populated, since most people have already left.
Makaland, by contrast, is characterized by dense forests, rivers, and lakes. All these become havens for rebel forces, providing hideouts for them to vanish into for extended periods.
While the army had amassed experience for a Waziristan Operation since 2002, they knew nothing of Makaland.
Hesitation Leads to Disadvantage
Hesitation to launch an offensive resulted in unforeseen complications.
Exactly a week following the announcement of the operation, a rebel leader, friendly toward the government and supposedly briefed on the coming offensive by army officials, was killed. This individual was seen as the successor of Baitullah Mehsud.
The army continued its endeavor to conquer remaining rebel areas, for fear the enemy would regain power during the army's absence. In addition, the army's success was hampered by a logistical problem: how to feed, house, and clothe 8,000 rebel prisoners.
Pakistani officials continue to shift responsibility for these individuals to the army, saying that the police were unable to deal with such a huge number of prisoners. Furthermore, they say, the justice system and anti-terrorism laws are ill equipped to handle court proceedings or hand down sentences. All this resulted in delays.
Winter is just setting in, and the authorities thought this would be a good time for a military operation.
Analysts believe there could be two reasons why the army has hesitated to face Al Qaeda and the Taliban up to now
The first is that each operation will lead to a conflict with rebel groups with strongholds in the tribal regions—groups that belong to the Haqqani-Network that has peace agreements with the army. They have so far concentrated their efforts to fight exclusively in Afghanistan. Many analysts believe the army relies heavily on their input for security in Southern Asia, and that any animosity with them would jeopardize the army's interests.
The second reason is the U.S. Kerry-Lager law that awards Pakistan US$1.5 billion in aid each year for the next five years. This law represents a never before seen possibility for the Pakistani government: to make political decisions on its own, without first considering the military. The military heavily criticized the law last week, and the government defended it, creating animosity in the political establishment. But given the dizzying speed with which the rebels have hit targets all over the nation over the past few weeks, public pressure has been on the military to strike harder at their former protégés.
Shams Ul Haq is a freelance journalist who writes for Asian and German-language newspapers. He is an expert on international terrorism and international migration who makes his home in Asia and Europe.
Read the German Original article.
