Xi Jinping Plans to Divert Blame for CCP Woes to Salvage His Legacy: Expert

Xi Jinping Plans to Divert Blame for CCP Woes to Salvage His Legacy: Expert
A security guard stands at the entrance during the closing ceremony of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 10, 2024. Photo by Jade Gao / AFP
Cathy Yin-Garton
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News Analysis

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finds itself in a quandary internally and externally, as the much-anticipated Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP remains indefinitely postponed. Legal scholar Yuan Hongbing, based in Australia, offers insights into the delay, alleging that Xi Jinping’s initial plan to assign blame for various crises onto Jiang Zemin was hindered by setbacks among his allies. Consequently, Xi had to defer the conference temporarily.

Traditionally, the Third Plenum serves as a platform for significant decisions, shaping the CCP’s policy framework for the next five to ten years, with a particular focus on economic policies. Its delay has fueled speculation about the underlying causes. Some attribute it to the profound economic downturn, making defining the conference’s agenda challenging. Others point to personnel challenges following the downfall of several senior officials handpicked and promoted by Xi himself.

Mr. Yuan offers a unique perspective per insider information, suggesting that Xi initially aimed to diverge from Jiang’s approach and introduce his blend of “reform and opening-up,” incorporating Maoist ideology. However, the loss of credibility due to the fall of key officials like Li Shangfu and Qin Gang compelled Xi to postpone the Third Plenum.

Mr. Yuan also alleges Xi’s preference for Cai Qi, emphasizing Mr. Cai’s control over the crucial Central Secretariat. One year ago, Mr. Cai, along with other secretaries of the Central Secretariat, proposed to Xi a strategy to address public discontent by initiating an internal struggle over the party’s direction through the Third Plenum, alleged Mr. Yuan

The focal point of this ideological struggle would center on Jiang, aiming to attribute the current political, economic, and social crises, including rampant corruption and economic decline, to Jiang’s policies. Mr. Yuan’s insider claimed Xi lauded this proposal as it aligned with his aspiration to establish himself as a leader akin to Mao Zedong by holding Jiang accountable for the CCP’s authoritarian rule and its resulting crises.

However, following the 20th CCP National Congress, a string of setbacks ensued, notably the downfall of prominent officials like Li Yuchao, Commander of the Rocket Force, Li Shangfu, Minister of National Defense, and Qin Gang, Minister of Foreign Affairs. These officials not only were embroiled in significant corruption but also exhibited political disloyalty to Xi, expressing discontent with his policies behind closed doors. Ironically, these individuals were part of Xi’s faction, known as the “Xi Family Army,” complicating efforts to link them with Jiang.

Currently, a wide-reaching corruption scandal within the Xi Family Army implicates two hundred generals and officials from the military-industrial complex, and the trend is continuing to escalate. Given this context, Xi faces challenges in entirely shifting the blame for corruption onto Jiang, prompting him to temporarily shelve this initiative.

Nonetheless, Mr. Yuan asserts that Xi is unlikely to abandon this notion entirely, seeing it as his political salvation. Mr. Yuan also alleged that Xi initially intended to target Deng Xiaoping as well, given Deng’s policies contradicted Mao’s. However, Xi recognized that his current level of personal prestige and political influence was insufficient to openly challenge Deng’s authority. Consequently, he temporarily set aside Deng and directed his criticism solely towards Jiang.

Regarding the timing of this maneuver, Mr. Yuan believes Xi can only revisit the issue after addressing the wave of disloyalty and corruption within the Xi Family Army. Alternatively, if Xi successfully initiates a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, he may openly criticize Jiang, extending the critique to Deng. This would align with his ambition to be regarded as a communist “great man” akin to Mao Zedong.

Second Red Generation Forewarned

According to insider information within the CCP obtained by Mr. Yuan, Xi tasked a deputy secretary from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to address representatives of the Second Red Generation (princelings), including Liu Yuan, the eldest son of former Chairman of China Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Pufang, the eldest son of Deng. They were briefed on how to handle the case involving Liu Yazhou and informed of the CCP’s preparedness for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Mr. Yuan asserts his information is credible.

Mr. Liu Yazhou, a former Air Force General and son-in-law of Li Xiannian, one of the Eight Elders of the CCP and former Chairman of China, has been a vocal advocate for Western universal values and opposed military action against Taiwan. His disappearance in 2021 culminated in a reported life imprisonment sentence at the end of 2023.

During the meeting between the deputy secretary and the Second Red Generation, emphasis was placed on the CCP facing a pivotal juncture of “great danger and great opportunity” amidst global tensions, particularly concerning the Taiwan issue. The central authority urged the Second Red Generation to “consider the overall situation” and refrain from engaging in activities deemed detrimental to Xi’s leadership.

Additionally, the deputy secretary briefed Mr. Liu Yuan, Mr. Deng Pufang, and others on the handling of Mr. Liu Yazhou case, which was framed as an “anti-party rebellion.” Mr. Liu Yazhou was accused of sowing dissent by criticizing Xi’s strategic decisions regarding Taiwan and spreading views that the war in the Taiwan Strait would be doomed to lose.

Mr. Yuan highlights the gravity of Xi’s directive to inform the Second Red Generation, warning against subversion or opposition to Xi’s leadership amid internal and external pressures. This move underscores Xi’s prioritization of the Taiwan issue over economic recovery and development.

Mr. Liu Yuan and Mr. Deng Pufang, prominent figures of the Red Second Generation within the CCP, represent a potential challenge to Xi’s authority. Mr. Yuan suggests that they, along with other members of the Red Second Generation, seek to oppose Xi’s dictatorship and advocate for a return to Mr. Deng Xiaoping’s principles of “reform and opening up” to achieve collective leadership.

Mr. Yuan asserts that Mr. Liu Yuan, Mr. Deng Pufang, Hu Deping, Ma Xiaoli, and other representatives of the Second Red Generation share the belief that continuing along Xi’s current trajectory will not only jeopardize the political and economic rights of their families but also escalate political and economic crises within the CCP. Consequently, they have come to a consensus on this matter.

In response to this situation, Xi’s severe sentencing of Mr. Liu Yazhou and briefing to Mr. Liu Yuan, Mr. Deng Pufang, and others before the two sessions serve as both a threat and a warning: any dissent may face similar consequences, as seen with Mr. Liu Yazhou.

While some analysts highlight China’s economic downturn as a crisis for the CCP, Mr. Yuan identifies Xi’s intention to instigate a conflict in the Taiwan Strait as a real crisis. Xi’s stance, as discussed during a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, aims to counter pessimism surrounding the Chinese economy domestically and internationally by promoting a positive narrative.

Mr. Yuan suggests that Xi’s window to launch a war in the Taiwan Strait falls between 2025 and 2027. This timing aligns with the CCP’s belief that after the 2024 U.S. election, the United States will experience heightened social division and political fragmentation, weakening its capacity to intervene in a Taiwan conflict.

Evidence points to a significant rupture in the relationship between Xi and the Red Second Generation. Independent commentator Cai Shenkun recently disclosed that in 2012, Xi, discontented with Jiang and Hu Jintao, sought support from Hu Deping, the son of former CCP leader Hu Yaobang, and other Red Second Generation members. Mr. Hu Deping proposed political reform suggestions to Xi but was politely rejected, leading to strain in their relationship.

Following the 18th Party Congress, Xi began relying on figures like Mr. Liu Yuan from the Second Red Generation in the military, though Mr. Liu Yuan later faced marginalization. Xi’s briefing to Mr. Liu Yuan, Mr. Deng Pufang, and other princelings, along with subsequent threats, is perceived as a risky move by Xi, which may provoke opposition from the princelings and threaten his hold on power.

Mr. Yuan warns that Xi’s actions could lead him down a path of self-destruction. The princelings, including Mr. Liu Yuan, Mr. Deng Pufang, Mr. Hu Deping, and Mr. Ma Xiaoli, advocated for a return to Mr. Deng Xiaoping’s principles of “reform and opening-up,” collective leadership, and a strategy of “hide and bide,” avoiding confrontation with the United States in international affairs.

Despite the princelings’ initiatives, Xi has fortified his rule with a sophisticated surveillance system, curbing their activities and influence.

Mr. Yuan believes that Xi’s pursuit of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, contrary to international norms, and the transformation of the corrupt CCP military into a battleground will lead to his downfall.